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i 
ISSUES PRESENTED I 
1. Should the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e f i c i e n c y judgment 
a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s be a f f i r m e d b e c a u s e p l a i n t i f f showed by a 
p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e i t d i s p o s e d o f t h e u n i q u e \ 
c o l l a t e r a l in t h i s c a s e in a c o m m e r c i a l l y r e a s o n a b l e manner as 
r e q u i r e d by Utah Code Ann. § 7 0 A - 9 - 5 0 4 ( 3 ) (1977) and Wyo. S t a t . 
§ 3 4 - 2 1 - 9 6 3 ( c ) ( 1 9 8 3 ) ? I t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n i t a c t e d wel l < 
w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n u n d e r t h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l Code in 
d i s p o s i n g of t h e u n i q u e c o l l a t e r a l in a commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e 
manner. i 
2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n in 
a d m i t t i n g i n t o e v i d e n c e a s b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s c e r t a i n p e r s o n a l 
g u a r a n t i e s s i g n e d by t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s ? I t i s i 
p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a c t e d w e l l w i t h i n i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n a s def ined by the Utah Rules of Evidence, the J u d i c i a l 
Code, and s e v e r a l d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Cour t . ^ 
3* Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t err in i n c l u d i n g t h e 
r e s i d u a l v a l u e of t h e c o l l a t e r a l a s p a r t of t h e d e f i c i e n c y 
j u d g m e n t ? I t i s t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h e d e f e n d a n t s ^ 
s t i p u l a t e d t o inc lude the r e s i d u a l va lue of the c o l l a t e r a l in the 
d e f i c i e n c y judgment as p a r t of p l a i n t i f f ' s b e n e f i t of b a r g a i n . 
4 . Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n in 
a w a r d i n g p l a i n t i f f T h i r t e e n Thousand Four Hundred E i g h t y - f i v e 
D o l l a r s ($13 ,485 .00) in a t t o r n e y ' s fees which were documented by 
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p l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y ' s t ime s h e e t s and a f f i d a v i t ? I t i s 
p l a i n t i f f ' s pos i t ion the d i s t r i c t court c l ea r ly acted wel l wi th in 
i t s d i sc re t ion as defined by severa l decis ions of t h i s Court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes are determinative of the issues 
presented in this case and are reproduced in the addendum 
attached hereto: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1980); 
2* Wyo. Stat. § 34-21-963(c) (1983); 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-17 (1977); 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-16.5 (1983); 
5. Utah R. Evid. Rule 803 (1984 Supp.); 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-507(2) (1980). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff IFG Leasing Company brought this action 
against defendants Rodney F. Gordon, Jim Hansen, and Frank A. 
Nelson to recover a deficiency judgment resulting from Bonneville 
Development Corporation's default under five (5) leases. The 
payments under the leases were personally guaranteed by the 
defendants. The action was tried in the district court, without 
a jury, Honorable Judith M. Billings presiding, on February 21, 
22, and 25, 1985. On February 27, 1985, Judge Billings filed 
her memorandum decision finding the personal guaranties signed 
by defendants were legally binding contracts, plaintiff's sale of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t h e c o l l a t e r a l was c o m m e r c i a l l y r e a s o n a b l e , a n d a w a r d i n g | 
p l a i n t i f f damages , l a t e r d e t e r m i n e d t o be in t h e sum of S i g h t 
Hundred T h i r t y - e i g h t Thousand S i x Hundred T w e n t y - t h r e e D o l l a r s 
and Twen ty - two C e n t s ( $ 8 3 8 , 6 2 3 . 2 2 ) , p l u s a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s o f i 
T h i r t e e n Thousand Four Hundred E i g h t y - f i v e D o l l a r s ($13 ,^85 .00 
and c o s t s of Th ree Hundred Two D o l l a r s ( $ 3 0 2 . 0 0 ) . R. 2 0 4 - 2 1 1 , 
2 1 5 - 2 2 1 . On A p r i l 17, 1 9 8 5 , d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d t h e i r n o t i c e of < 
a p p e a l . R. 279. ••••• 
For a l l p u r p o s e s in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s a p p e a l , t he -
f o l l o w i n g f a c t s a r e t r u e , s u p p o r t e d by t h e r e c o r d , a n d ' 
u n d i s p u t e d . ' ' 
1 . D e f e n d a n t s w e r e p r i n c i p a l s o f B o n n e v i l l e 
D e v e l o p m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n . T r . 1 0 1 , 2 1 8 , 2 4 3 , B o n n e v i l l e • ' ' 
Deve lopment C o r p o r a t i o n e n t e r e d i n t o 5 s e p a r a c e equipment l e a s e s 
wi th p l a i n t i f f . E x h i b i t s 1-P, 8 - ? , 15 -P , 2 2 - P , and 2 9 - P . The 
l e a s e d e q u i p m e n t c o n s i s t e d of such t h i n g s as k i t c h e n equipment , 
h o t e l f u r n i t u r e , bedroom f u r n i t u r e , c a s h r e g i s t e r s , a c c o u n t i n g 
e q u i p m e n t , f u r n a c e s , d o o r s , h e a t pumps, and t h e r m o s t a t s . Most, 
i 
if not all, of this leased equipment was installed in an ongoing 
business known as the Svanston Ramada Inn. Tr. 12, 95, 96 and 
Exhibits 1-P, 8-P, 15-P, 22-P, and 29-P. 
1It is well understood "in reviewing the findings and 
judgment of the trial court, after trial on the merits, this 
Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, and the judgment will be affirmed where the < 
findings of fact are substantiated by the evidence." Sharoe v. 
American Medical Systems, Inc., 671 P.2d 185, 187 (Utah 1963). 
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2 . D e f e n d a n t s s i g n e d p e r s o n a l , u n c o n d i t i o n a l 
g u a r a n t i e s which t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found o b l i g a t e d d e f e n d a n t s 
fo r t h e l e a s e payments under t h e 5 l e a s e s in q u e s t i o n . Tr . 86, 
120, 221-226, 244; see a l s o , E x h i b i t s 2 - P , 9 - P , 16-P , 2 3 - P , and 
3 0 - P ; F i n d i n g No. 5 , a t r u e and e x a c t copy of which, des igna ted 
E x h i b i t "A," i s s e t f o r t h in the addendum and i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n 
by r e f e r e n c e . The t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d t h e g u a r a n t e e s we re 
n e g o t i a t e d and e x e c u t e d from O c t o b e r , 1980 t h r o u g h S e p t e m b e r , 
1 9 8 1 . R. 2 0 5 ; s e e a l s o , Memorandum D e c i s i o n , a t r u e and exac t 
copy of wh ich , d e s i g n a t e d E x h i b i t " B , " i s s e t f o r t h in t h e 
addendum and i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n by r e f e r e n c e . The d i s t r i c t 
cou r t a l s o found the g u a r a n t i e s were i n t e n d e d by t h e p a r t i e s t o 
g u a r a n t e e t h e f i v e l e a s e s e n t e r e d i n t o by Bonnev i l l e Development 
C o r p o r a t i o n . R. 206; see a l s o , Addendum, Exh ib i t ffB.ff 
3* Bonnevi l l e Development Corpora t ion d e f a u l t e d in t h e 
l e a s e payments in May, 1982. R. 205; see a l s o , Addendum, Exh ib i t 
f fB. f f S e v e r a l demand l e t t e r s w e r e w r i t t e n t o B o n n e v i l l e 
D e v e l o p m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n , i t s o f f i c e r s , and o t h e r i n t e r e s t e d 
p a r t i e s a t t e m p t i n g t o c u r e t h e d e f a u l t . T r . 1 9 2 - 1 9 8 . A l s o , 
d e f e n d a n t Gordon t o l d p l a i n t i f f t h e d e f a u l t would be cu red . Tr . 
199. 
4 . B o n n e v i l l e Development C o r p o r a t i o n f a i l e d to cure 
the d e f a u l t under the l e a s e s and in October , 1982, a t t h e r e q u e s t 
of Commercia l S e c u r i t y Bank, t h e c o r p o r a t i o n was p l a c e d under 
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i 
r e c e i v e r s h i p . T r . 46 , 9 7 . Subsequen t ly , Bonnev i l l e Development * 
Corpora t ion f i l e d a Chapter 11 R e o r g a n i z a t i o n B a n k r u p t c y in May, 
1983. 
5 . P l a i n t i f f b e g a n e x t e n s i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h * 
Commercial S e c u r i t y Bank and F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank in t h e s p r i n g of 
1984 . T r . 66 , 8 8 - 8 9 . The n e g o t i a t i o n s p r o c e e d e d s u c c e s s f u l l y 
and p l a i n t i f f s e n t defendants a n o t i c e of s a l e on March 30 , 1984 , * 
i n d i c a t i n g t h e c o l l a t e r a l would be s o l d a t a p u b l i c or p r i v a t e 
s a l e . Tr. 48; s e e a l s o , E x h i b i t 4 3 - P . D e f e n d a n t s d i d n o t 
a t t e m p t t o p r o t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s by o f f e r i n g t o purchase the 
c o l l a t e r a l or by f i n d i n g a p u r c h a s e r . The s a l e was consummated 
b e t w e e n p l a i n t i f f and t h e two a f o r e m e n t i o n e d banks and t h e 
purchase p r i c e of E i g h t y - f i v e Thousand D o l l a r s ( $ 8 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) was 
paid in September, 1984. Tr . 49, 90. The d i s t r i c t cour t found: 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t the p l a i n t i f f 
a t t e m p t e d t o f o r c e p a y m e n t s J 
d u r i n g t h e summer of 1985, but 
d i d n o t r e p o s s e s s t h e 
c o l l a t e r a l . They w e r e t h e n 
s t o p p e d by a f i l i n g o f a 
r e c e i v e r s h i p in t h e f a l l of 
1 9 8 2 , a n d u l t i m a t e l y by a 4 
b a n k r u p t c y . The C o u r t i s 
p u r s u a d e d t h a t t h e p e c u l i a r 
n a t u r e of t h e e q u i p m e n t and 
the i n t e r v e n i n g r e c e i v e r s h i p -
b a n k r u p t c y made the long de lay 
r e a s o n a b l e . The equ ipmen t was 4 
u n i q u e and much of i t a t t a c h e d 
t o t h e p r o p e r t y in E v a n s t o n . 
T h e p l a i n t i f f c o u l d h a v e 
r e a s o n a b l y a s s u m e d t h a t i t s 
b e s t chance of r ecovery on the 
c o l l a t e r a l was t o w a i t u n t i l I 
er 
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the entire property could be 
sold by either the receiver or 
the trustee in , bankruptcy. 
The plaintiff could reasonably 
have assumed that the highest 
bid for the equipment would be 
by the owner of the hotel. 
R. 208; see also, Addendum, Exhibit f?Bfl (emphasis added). 
6. During extensive negotiations between plaintiff and 
the aforementioned banks, representatives of the banks indicated 
there was an inventory of the collateral at the property. Tr. 
88-99; 92. 
7. To establish the market value of the collateral at 
trial, plaintiff called as an expert witness, Susan Trunzo of S. 
F. Trunzo Auctioneers. S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers is based in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and engaged in the business of liquidating 
various types of materials, equipment, and property. Tr. 165. 
Ms. Trunzo, at the time of trial, had been personally involved in 
the business for 15 years. Tr. 165. Ms. Trunzo testified she 
had extensive experience selling the type of collateral involved 
in this case. Tr. 165-175. After hearing Ms. Trunzo's testimony 
and observing her demeanor as a witness, the district court 
qualified her as an expert witness relative to the disposition of 
most of the collateral involved in this case. Tr. 172, 174. Ms. 
Trunzo testified there would be significant costs involved in 
removing the type of collateral involved in this case from the 
hotel and selling it elsewhere. Based upon her experience, the 
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inventory of the collateral, and its original cost, Ms. Trunzo 
testified that in disposing of the collateral in this case, "ray 
opinion would be that a recovery of somewhere between 15 to 25 
percent. And this has to be a range because some of the items, I 
feel, there would be nearly a zero percent recovery, would be 
very reasonable." Tr. 176. 
8. William Ellingson, a former IFG salesman, testified 
the five leases involved in this case would never have been 
funded without personal guaranties from the defendants. Tr. 302, 
332. Defendants testified the guaranties they signed were not 
intended to apply to the five leases in question, but applied to 
subsequent unfunded leases. However, B. J. Rakes, plaintifffs 
senior adjuster, testified Mr. Holmes of Bonneville Development 
Corporation was sent at least one letter outlining the necessary 
requirements for plaintiff to fund the five leases in question, 
including personal guaranties. Tr. 262-263; see also, Exhibit 
58-P. Ms. Rakes also testified of an internal memorandum in 
plaintiff's files indicating personal guaranties from the 
defendants were received in relation to the five leases in 
question. Tr. 269-272; see also, Exhibit 60-P. Mr. Ellingson 
also testified he discussed personal guaranties on the five 
leases in question with defendant Hansen prior to December 17, 
1980. Tr. 297. Mr. Ellingson testified personal guaranties 
relating to the five leases in question were mailed to the 
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defendants on February 26, 1981, and that he was present and saw 
the defendants sign at least two of the guaranties in question. 
Tr. 297-298, 328-329. Finally, Mr. Ellingson testified 
plaintiff's internal documents indicated the receipt of signed 
personal guaranties from defendants guaranteeing the payments 
under the leases in question. Tr. 327-328; see also, Exhibit 
60-P. The foregoing testimony of Ms. Rakes and Mr. Ellingson was 
uncontroverted. 
9i "Plaintiff's attorney, J. Bruce Reading, proffered 
at trial that Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) was a reasonable 
attorney's fee in this case. Tr. 100. In response to that 
proffer, the district court requested that Mr. Reading submit 
accounting sheets and an affidavit in support of his request for 
attorney's fees. Tr. 100. Mr. Reading did so and the district 
court awarded attorney's fees in the sum of Thirteen Thousand 
Four Hundred Eighty-five Dollars ($13,458.00) pursuant to the 
accounting sheets and affidavit. R. 221; see also, Addendum, 
Exhibit "A." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
All of the contentions raised by defendants on appeal 
were presented to the district court through evidence introduced 
at trial or pleadings submitted after trial. The district court 
considered and rejected each one. Consequently, the primary task 
of this Court is to determine if plaintiff showed by a 
8 
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p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t i t d i sposed of the c o l l a t e r a l * 
in a commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e manner, and i f Judge B i l l i n g s abused 
her d i s c r e t i o n in a d m i t t i n g the p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t i e s i n t o evidence 
or in a w a r d i n g p l a i n t i f f a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h A 
p l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y ' s a f f i d a v i t and time s h e e t s . 
I t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s 
judgment s h o u l d be a f f i r m e d in a l l r e s p e c t s fo r t h e f o l l o w i n g * 
f i ve r e a s o n s . F i r s t , the p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e c l e a r l y 
shows p l a i n t i f f s o l d t h e unique c o l l a t e r a l involved in t h i s case 
in a c o m m e r c i a l l y r e a s o n a b l e m a n n e r . S e c o n d , a f t e r b e i n g 
n o t i f i e d of t h e p e n d i n g s a l e of t h e c o l l a t e r a l , the defendants 
took no a c t i o n to p r o t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s by o f f e r i n g t o p u r c h a s e 
or f i n d i n g a p u r c h a s e r f o r t h e c o l l a t e r a l . T h i r d , a d e q u a t e 
foundat ion was l a i d and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was w e l l w i t h i n i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n in a d m i t t i n g the p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t i e s i n t o evidence as 
b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s and s u b s e q u e n t l y f i n d i n g them t o be l e g a l l y 
b i n d i n g c o n t r a c t s . F o u r t h , the p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d to a r e s i d u a l 
va lue of the c o l l a t e r a l as p a r t of p l a i n t i f f ' s b e n e f i t of b a r g a i n 
u n d e r t h e l e a s e s . F i n a l l y , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s award of 
a t t o r n e y fees was based on p l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y ' s summary t ime 
s h e e t s and p e r s o n a l a f f i d a v i t and s a i d award i s c l e a r l y beyond 
i 
attack. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
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THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
PLAINTIFF DISPOSED OF THE COLLATERAL 
IN A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER. 
In P o i n t I of t h e i r b r i e f , defendants argue p l a i n t i f f ' s 
d i s p o s i t i o n of the c o l l a t e r a l was c o m m e r c i a l l y u n r e a s o n a b l e and 
in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 7 0 A - 9 - 5 0 4 ( 3 ) (1980) ( s e e , 
Addendum, E x h i b i t ffCTf) and i t s Wyoming c o u n t e r p a r t , Wyoming 
S t a t u t e § 3 4 - 2 1 - 9 6 3 ( c ) (1983) Cs.ee, Addendum, Exhibit "D") . The 
Wyoming s t a t u t e i s v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o S e c t i o n 7 0 A - 9 - 5 0 4 ( 3 ) , 
which in p e r t i n e n t p a r t s t a t e s : 
D i s p o s i t i o n of t h e c o l l a t e r a l 
may be by p u b l i c or p r i v a t e 
p r o c e e d i n g s and may be made by 
w a y o f o n e ( 1 ) o r m o r e 
c o n t r a c t s . S a l e o r o t h e r 
d i s p o s i t i o n may be a s a u n i t 
o r i n p a r c e l s a n d 
a t any t ime and p l a c e and on 
any t e r m s bu t e v e r y a s p e c t of 
the d i s p o s i t i o n i n c l u d i n g t h e 
m e t h o d , manne r , t i m e , p l a c e 
and terms must be c o m m e r c i a l l y 
r e a s o n a b l e . 
D e f e n d a n t s s p e c i f i c a l l y make two a r g u m e n t s . F i r s t , 
d e f e n d a n t s a r g u e t h a t p l a i n t i f f d i d n o t c a r r y i t s b u r d e n of 
showing t h e a c t u a l t e r m s of s a l e were c o m m e r c i a l l y r e a s o n a b l e . 
Second, defendants argue the l eng th of t i m e t h a t i t t ook t o s e l l 
t h e c o l l a t e r a l was u n r e a s o n a b l e . D e f e n d a n t s 1 c o n t e n t i o n s a r e 
wi thout mer i t for the fo l lowing r e a s o n s . 
A. The e v i d e n c e c l e a r l y shows t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s 
d i s p o s i t i o n of the c o l l a t e r a l was commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e . 
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I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i s s u e s of f a c t in c i v i l i 
cases a r e to be determined in a c c o r d a n c e w i th t h e p r e p o n d e r a n c e 
o f t h e e v i d e n c e . P r o o f b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t i s n o t 
n e c e s s a r y . The term preponderance of e v i d e n c e means t h e w e i g h t , • ^ 
c r e d i t , and v a l u e of t h e e v i d e n c e . I t i s not dependent upon the 
number of w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f y i n g on e i t h e r s i d e , but r a t h e r upon 
t h e c r e d i b i l i t y w h i c h , in l i g h t of a l l the ev idence in the c a s e , ^ 
the t r i e r of f a c t a t t r i b u t e s to t h e i r t es t imony and t h e e f f e c t of 
t h a t t e s t i m o n y in i n d u c i n g b e l i e f in i t s t r u t h . 30 Am. J u r . 2d 
Evidence §§ 1163, 1164 (1967) . * 
In a p p l y i n g t h e above s t a n d a r d t o c a s e s i nvo lv ing the 
s a l e of s e c u r e d c o l l a t e r a l , c o u r t s t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y , 
i n c l u d i n g t h i s C o u r t , e m p h a s i z e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of c a r e f u l l y 
examining the unique f a c t s of each p a r t i c u l a r case in d e t e r m i n i n g 
commerc i a l r e a s o n a b l e n e s s . For example , in Scharf v. BMG Corp . , 
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), a l e s s o r who had r e p o s s e s s e d and s o l d 
equ ipmen t brought a c t i o n a g a i n s t the l e a s e gua ran to r to recover a 
d e f i c i e n c y . In Scharf , defendant p e r s o n a l l y gua ran t eed l e a s e s on 
two p i e c e s of r e p o s s e s s e d equipment . At t r i a l , defendant argued 
t h e s a l e of t h e e q u i p m e n t f a i l e d t o c o m p l y w i t h S e c t i o n 
7 0 A - 9 - 5 0 4 ( 3 ) and a s s e r t e d t h e me thod , manner, and t iming of the 
i 
s a l e a l l f a i l e d to meet the s t a n d a r d of commercial r e a s o n a b l e n e s s . 
A f t e r h e a r i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t f i l e d d e t a i l e d 
f i n d i n g s of f a c t s u p p o r t i n g i t s c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t t h e s a l e was 
I 
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conducted in a commercially reasonable manner and that the prices 
received for the equipment reflected reasonable market value• 
On appeal, defendant again argued the sale was not 
commercially reasonable and attacked the trial court's factual 
findings and its legal conclusions. The defendant, as do the 
defendants in the instant case, made numerous arguments based 
on the facts as he presented them to the trial court, rather than 
the facts as found by that court.2 
In affirming the trial court's judgment that the sale 
was commercially reasonable, this court stated as follows: 
S i n c e t h e s t a t u t o r y s t a n d a r d 
of c o m m e r c i a l r e a s o n a b l e n e s s 
c a n n o t be m e a s u r e d w i t h a 
b r i g h t - l i n e t e s t , whether any 
p a r t i c u l a r s a l e i s c o m m e r -
c i a l l y r e a s o n a b l e i s t o be 
d e t e r m i n e d on a c a s e - b v - c a s e 
b a s i s . T h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r t h e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e s a l e in 
t h e m a n n e r a n d b u s i n e s s 
c o n t e x t i n which i t o c c u r r e d 
s u p p o r t a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e 
s a l e w a s c o n d u c t e d i n a 
commerc ia l ly r e a s o n a b l e manner. 
In t h i s c a s e , t h e f a c t s found 
by t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o v i d e 
ample , s u p p o r t - f o r t h e l e g a l 
2 I n a d d r e s s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s burden of proof on appea l 
t he Scharf c o u r t s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : ftTo mount a s u c c e s s f u l a t t a c k 
on the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , an a p p e l l a n t must m a r s h a l l 
a l l of the ev idence in suppo r t of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and 
then demons t r a t e t h a t even viewing i t in the l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e 
to the c o u r t below, the ev idence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to suppor t the 
f i n d i n g s . Scharf, 700 P.2d a t 1070. P l a i n t i f f contends defendant 
in t h i s case has woeful ly f a i l e d to c a r r y i t s burden under the 
above s t a n d a r d . 
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i 
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t - t h e s a l e was I 
commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e . 
Scharf, 700 P.2d a t 1070-1071 (emphasis a d d e d ) . 
Fur the rmore , in W i l k e r s o n Motor C o . , I n c . v . J o h n s o n , • • ' < 
580 P . 2 d 505 ( O k l a . 1 9 7 8 ) , an a u t o m o b i l e s e l l e r b r o u g h t a 
d e f i c i e n c y a c t i o n a g a i n s t a d e f a u l t i n g p u r c h a s e r . The d e f i c i e n c y 
r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e s a l e o f a r e p o s s e s s e d a u t o m o b i l e ^ 
be longing to t h e d e f a u l t i n g p u r c h a s e r . The s e c u r e d p a r t y gave 
w r i t t e n n o t i c e of i t s - i n t e n t i o n t o s e l l t h e a u t o m o b i l e . No 
p u r c h a s e r s , o t h e r t h a n t h e s e c u r e d p a r t y , a t t e n d e d t h e s a l e or * 
e n t e r e d b i d s . The s e c u r e d p a r t y purchased the au tomobi le a t i t s 
own s a l e . One of the i s s u e s before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
was w h e t h e r a t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t i o n n a r r o w i n g t h e o p t i o n s 
a v a i l a b l e to the secured p a r t y in d i spos ing of the c o l l a t e r a l was 
improper . In c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s i s s u e , the c o u r t s t a t e d : 
The c l e a r i n t e n t of t h e a p p l i -
c a b l e p r o v i s i o n s of the UCC i s 
t o a l l o w t h e r e p o s s e s s i n g 
s e c u r e d p a r t y s u b s t a n t i a l 
f l e x i b i l i t y a s t o t h e m e t h o d 
c h o s e n t o d i s p o s e o f t h e I 
c o l l a t e r a l . . . . The i n s t r u c -
t i o n d e n i e d a p p e l l a n t t h e 
f l e x i b i l i t y a f f o r d e d i t a s a 
s e c u r e d p a r t y unde r t h e UCC, 
and was i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e 
f a c t s of the case a t b a r . I 
W i l k e r s o n , 580 P. 2d a t 507-508; see a l s o , Wilson Leasing Co. v. 
Seaway Pha rmaca l C o r p . , 53 Mich . App. 359, 220 N.W.2d 8 3 , 89 
i 
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( 1 9 7 4 ) ( t h e UCC does not r e q u i r e t h a t r e p o s s e s s e d c o l l a t e r a l be 
d i sposed of in any p a r t i c u l a r manner ) . 
In examining the unique f a c t s of each case and a l l o w i n g 
t h e c r e d i t o r maximum f l e x i b i l i t y in d i s p o s i n g of c o l l a t e r a l , 
c o u r t s do not focus on any one a s p e c t of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n such as 
t h e p r i c e o b t a i n e d or the p resence of the c o l l a t e r a l a t the s a l e . 
For example, in In r e Zsa Zsa Limi ted , 352 F. Supp. 665 (S .D .N .Y . 
1 9 7 2 ) , t h e b a n k r u p t c y t r u s t e e f i l e d a p e t i t i o n to review a s a l e 
of secured c o l l a t e r a l made on o r d e r of a r e f e r e e in b a n k r u p t c y . 
P r i o r t o a d j u d i c a t i o n a s a deb tor and dur ing proceed ings pending 
a g a i n s t i t under the Bankruptcy Act, the debtor made a s e t t l e m e n t 
w i t h c e r t a i n of i t s s e c u r e d c r e d i t o r s . The s e t t l e m e n t was 
approved by t h e b a n k r u p t c y r e f e r e e and f o l l o w i n g t h e a p p r o v a l , 
t h e c r e d i t o r s o l d t h e c o l l a t e r a l a t a j u d i c i a l l y approved s a l e . 
The t r u s t e e c o n t e n d e d in i t s p e t i t i o n t h e s a l e was i m p r o p e r l y 
c o n d u c t e d and c o m m e r c i a l l y u n r e a s o n a b l e . The i s s u e s q u a r e l y 
b e f o r e t h e c o u r t was w h e t h e r t h e s a l e was c o n d u c t e d i n a 
c o m m e r c i a l l y r e a s o n a b l e manner u n d e r New Y o r k ' s v e r s i o n of 
S e c t i o n 9 - 5 0 4 ( 3 ) . In Zsa Z s a , t h e r e was t e s t i m o n y from an 
a u c t i o n e e r s t a t i n g t h a t while only $300,000 was r e c e i v e d for the 
goods w i t h a s u p p o s e d c o s t e x c e e d i n g $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 and a s u p p o s e d 
w h o l e s a l e v a l u e ove r $ 1 . 7 5 m i l l i o n , a 10—15* s a l v a g e value was 
q u i t e f a i r . In ho ld ing the s a l e was commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e , t h e 
cour t made s e v e r a l p e r t i n e n t o b s e r v a t i o n s : 
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I t i s t h e a g g r e g a t e o f 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n e a c h 
c a s e - - r a t h e r t h a n s p e c i f i c 
d e t a i l s of t h e s a l e t a k e n in 
i s o l a t i o n - - t h a t s h o u l d be 
emphasized in a r e v i e w of t h e 
s a l e . . . . While t h e amount 
r e c e i v e d p r o v i d e s o n l y 10 
c e n t s on t h e d o l l a r , t h e 
t e s t i m o n y of t h e a u c t i o n e e r 
t h a t t h i s i s a f a i r r e t u r n , 
a n a f f i d a v i t o f d e f e n s e 
c o u n s e l f u r n i s h e d a t t h e 
r e q u e s t of t h e C o u r t , . . . 
c o n v i n c e s t h e Cour t t h a t t h e 
p r i c e i s not u n r e a s o n a b l e . 
In r e Zsa Zsa , 352 F . Supp. a t 670-671; see a l s o , Gulf Homes v. 
Goubeaux, 124 A r i z . 142, 602 P.2d 810 , 812 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ( t h e UCC does 
no t make t h e p resence of the c o l l a t e r a l a t a s a l e a n e c e s s i t y for 
v a l i d r e p o s s e s s i o n s a l e ) ; Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-507 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ( t h e 
f a c t t h a t a b e t t e r p r i c e could have been ob ta ined by a s a l e a t a 
d i f f e r e n t t ime or in a method d i f f e r e n t from t h a t s e l e c t e d by t h e 
i 
s e c u r e d p a r t y i s no t of i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h t h a t the 
s a l e was not made in a commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e manner) . 
Defendants a l s o a r g u e p l a i n t i f f a c t e d u n r e a s o n a b l y in 
i 
taking the time it did to negotiate a sale. Case law simply does 
not support defendants1 tenuous assertion. For example, in 
Business Finance Co., Inc. v. Red Barn, Inc., 517 P.2d 383 (Mont. 
1973), the secured party leased two cash registers, an adding 
machine, a filing cabinet, and an office chair to defendant for 
installation and use in its bar and night club. Subsequently, 
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t h e d e f e n d a n t d e f a u l t e d under t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e and t h e 
equipment was r e p o s s e s s e d some 17 months a f t e r t h e l a s t payment 
was made. One of t h e i s s u e s before the Supreme Court of Montana 
was whether t h e s e c u r e d p a r t y a c t e d u n r e a s o n a b l y in w a i t i n g 17 
m o n t h s , d u r i n g which t ime t h e payments were in d e f a u l t , before 
r e p o s s e s s i n g t h e e q u i p m e n t . In f i n d i n g t h e r e was no m e r i t t o 
d e f e n d a n t ' s argument , the cour t s t a t e d : 
Again we r e f e r to t h e f r e q u e n t 
n o t i c e s of d e f a u l t p r o v i d e d 
t h e [ d e f e n d a n t ] d u r i n g t h i s 
p e r i o d . Th i s was a r e a s o n a b l e 
e f f o r t t o a v o i d l o s s e s u n d e r 
t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and s h o u l d 
have s e r v e d n o t i c e upon t h e 
[ d e f e n d a n t ] to t ake some s t e p s 
t o r e c t i f y t h e s i t u a t i o n . 
B u s i n e s s F i n a n c e C o m p a n y , 
I n c . 
w a s 
, the nondefa' 
o n l y 
r e a s o n a b l y 
s t a n c e s , 
u n n e c e s s a r i 
r e 
un< 
s 
i y 
9 U 
ier 
0 
en. 
u l t in 
i r e d 
t h e 
a s 
l a r g e 
g p a r t y , 
t o a c t 
c i r c u m -
t o n o t 
damages 
caused by the d e f a u l t . 
B u s i n e s s F i n a n c e , 517 P.2d a t 386 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ; s e e a l s o , 
S i e r r a F i n a n c i a l Corp. v . Brooks -Fa r re r Co. , 15 C a l . App. 3d 698 , 
98 Cal R p t r . 422 , 425 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ( S e c t i o n 9-504 does not e x p l i c i t l y 
r e q u i r e the s e c u r e d p a r t y t o t a k e p o s s e s s i o n of' t h e c o l l a t e r a l 
p r i o r to the f o r e c l o s u r e s a l e ) . 
In a p p l y i n g the law d i s cus sed above to the f a c t s of the 
i n s t a n t c a s e , i t becomes c l e a r t h a t p l a i n t i f f c a r r i e d i t s burden 
of p r o o f by s h o w i n g i t a c t e d a s r e a s o n a b l y a s p o s s i b l e in 
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d i s p o s i n g of t h e u n i q u e c o l l a t e r a l u n d e r t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The above c o n c l u s i o n i s ba sed on t h e f o l l o w i n g 
t h r e e p r o p o s i t i o n s . F i r s t , t h e c o l l a t e r a l was unique in n a t u r e 
b e c a u s e i t c o u l d no t e a s i l y be d e t a c h e d from t h e p r e m i s e s and 
s o l d . The c o l l a t e r a l c o n s i s t e d of f u r n i s h i n g s and e q u i p m e n t , 
much of which was p h y s i c a l l y a t t a c h e d t o t h e p r e m i s e s , making i t 
d i f f i c u l t , i f no t i m p o s s i b l e t o remove and s e l l the c o l l a t e r a l . 
T h e r e f o r e , a f t e r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , p l a i n t i f f d e c i d e d i t 
would be most c o m m e r c i a l l y r e a s o n a b l e t o s e l l t h e c o l l a t e r a l to 
t h e two m o r t g a g e e b a n k s . The r e c o r d c l e a r l y s u p p o r t s t h e 
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of t h a t d e c i s i o n . For e x a m p l e , d u r i n g Mr. 
M a r s h a l l ' s c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n of p l a i n t i f f ' s e x p e r t w i t n e s s Susan 
Trunzo, the r ecord s t a t e s as f o l l o w s : 
Q. With r e s p e c t t o what y o u ' v e 
t o l d u s a b o u t p e r c e n t a g e 
r e c o v e r y w o u l d i t m a k e a 
d i f f e r e n c e , in your o p i n i o n , i f 
the i t ems t h a t you were t r y i n g 
t o s e l l w e r e i n s t a l l e d in a 
g o i n g b u s i n e s s and t h e y w e r e 
c r u c i a l t o t h e c o n t i n u e d 
o p e r a t i o n of t h a t b u s i n e s s ? 
Could you g e t more for i t under 
t hose c i r cums tances? 
A. I t wou ld d e p e n d who was 
b u y i n g . When you h a v e i t e m s 
t h a t a r e i n s t a l l e d t h e y a r e of 
i n t e r e s t t o o n l y one p e r c e n t , 
g e n e r a l l y , and t h a t wou ld be 
t h e p e r s o n who o w n s t h e 
b u i l d i n g or who i s o p e r a t i n g 
t h a t b u s i n e s s a s i t i s . In a 
f a i r market s i t u a t i o n I b e l i e v e 
t h a t t h e y wou ld n o t be g i v e n 
v e r y s t r o n g c o m p e t i t i o n by 
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a n y o n e 
b e c a u s e 
a n d r i 
a f f e c t s 
on 
t o 
many 
p u l l 
p t h e m 
o f 
t h e 
o u t 
t h e i r v a l u e 
m a n y c a s e s y o u w 
r e c e i v e a n y 
e l s e w o u l d 
b i d o r p u t 
b i d d 
even 
a do 
i n $ 
want 
l i a r 
t h 
i 
, ? 
• 
o u 
o r 
t o 
e i t e m s 
t e r n s up 
r e a t 1 y 
And i n 
I d n o t 
a n y o n e 
p l a c e a 
v a l u e on 
i n s t a l l e d f i x t u r e s , 
T r . 182-183 (emphasis a d d e d ) . 
F u r t h e r , M s . T r u n z o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e w e r e 
s i g n i f i c a n t c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i th r emoving t h e c o l l a t e r a l from 
t h e h o t e l which would a f f e c t any d e c i s i o n to a t t empt t o s e l l t he 
c o l l a t e r a l to anyone o the r t han t h e owners of t h e h o t e l . A l s o , 
J u d g e B i l l i n g s h e l d t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e 
c o l l a t e r a l was commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e in her memorandum d e c i s i o n 
by s t a t i n g : 
The 
p e c 
C o u r t 
u 1 i a 
e q u i pmen1 
r e c e i v e r s 
t h e 
e q u i 
o f i 
l o n g 
pment 
. t a t t 
i s 
r n 
t an 
h i p -
d e l a 
was 
p u r s u a d e d 
1 a t u r e 
t h a t t h e 
0 f t h e 
d t h e i n t e r v e n i n g 
- b a n k r u p 
.y r e a s o n a 
un i q u e , 
a c h e d t o t h e 
t c y 
b l e . 
a n d 
P r o 
m a d e 
The 
much 
p e r t y 
i n E v a n s t o n . The p l a i n t i f f 
c o u l d h a v e r e a s o n a b l y assumed 
t h a t i t s b e s t c h a n c e o f 
r e c o v e r y on t h e c o l l a t e r a l was 
t o w a i t u n t i l t h e e n t i r e 
p r o p e r t y c o u l d be s o l d by 
e i t h e r t h e r e c e i v e r o r t h e 
t r u s t e e in b a n k r u p t c y . The 
p l a i n t i f f would r e a s o n a b l y have 
a s s u m e d t h a t t h e h i g h e s t b id 
f o r t h e equ ipmen t would be by 
t h e owner of t h e h o t e l . . . . 
The c o u r t i s p u r s u a d e d t h a t a 
p r i v a t e s a l e i s r e a s o n a b l e in 
t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h e 
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p l a i n t i f f was r e a s o n a b l e in i t s 
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a p u b l i c s a l e 
wou ld h a v e b r o u g h t no h i g h e r 
p r i c e b e c a u s e of t h e n a t u r e of 
the equipment . 
R. 208-209; s e e , Addendum, E x h i b i t "B t! (emphasis a d d e d ) . 
Second , t h e i n t e r v e n i n g r e c e i v e r s h i p and b a n k r u p t c y 
f r u s t r a t e d p l a i n t i f f ' s g o o d - f a i t h e f f o r t s t o d i s p o s e of t h e 
c o l l a t e r a l more r a p i d l y , and f i n a l l y l e d t o a d e c i s i o n t h a t i t 
would be most r e a s o n a b l e , under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , to s e l l the 
c o l l a t e r a l t o Commercia l S e c u r i t y and F i r s t S e c u r i t y Banks • 
R. 208-209; s e e , Addendum, Exh ib i t "B" . 
Th i rd , the p r i c e r e c e i v e d by the s a l e of t h e c o l l a t e r a l 
t o t h e b a n k s was w e l l w i t h i n r e a s o n a b l e s t a n d a r d s and was 
suppor ted by p l a i n t i f f ' s e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y . P l a i n t i f f ' s e x p e r t 
w i tnes s s t a t e d : 
My o p i n i o n w o u l d be t h a t a 
r e c o v e r y of somewhere be tweeen 
15 t o 25 p e r c e n t . And t h i s has 
t o be a r a n g e b e c a u s e some of 
t h e i t e m s , I f e e l , t h e r e would 
b e n e a r l y a z e r o p e r c e n t 
r e c o v e r y , w o u l d b e v e r y 
r e a s o n a b l e . 
Tr. 176 (emphasis added). 
The collateral was actually sold for approximately 18% 
of its original cost, which is well within the range plaintiff's 
expert indicated would be "very reasonable." 
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B. The cases c i t e d by defendants a l l eged ly supporting 
t h e i r e r roneous argument a r e not on p o i n t b e c a u s e t h e y a r e 
f ac tua l ly d i s t ingu ishab le or misquoted. 
I t is p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n each of the cases c i t e d by 
defendants in support of t he i r commercially unreasonable argument 
a r e so e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h a t 
defendants a re l e f t , in the f ina l a n a l y s i s , with only t he i r bare, 
unsupportable a s s e r t i o n s . For example, defendants r e l y h e a v i l y 
on FMA F i n a n c i a l Corp. v. P ro -P r in t e r s , 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979), 
a l l eg ing tha t Pro-Pr in te rs i s so fac tua l ly s imi la r to the i n s t a n t 
c a s e t h a t i t i s c o n t r o l l i n g . However, on c l o s e examina t ion , 
Pro-Pr i n t e r s i s f a c t u a l l y d i s s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . 
P r o - P r i n t e r s emphasized and focused on the c r e d i t o r ' s f a i lu re to 
give not ice of s a l e , not the f a i l u r e to conduct a commercial ly 
r e a s o n a b l e s a l e . This i s a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f a c t o r because the 
not ice provision of Section 70A-9-504 enables deb to r s to p r o t e c t 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t by b idd ing at the sa le or finding a purchaser who 
wi l l pay a f a i r p r i c e . P ro -P r in t e r s , 590 P.2d a t 807. Also, the 
c o l l a t e r a l in P r o - P r i n t e r s was t o t a l l y d e t a c h a b l e and not 
connected to any proper ty . F ina l ly , the c red i to r in P r o - P r i n t e r s 
did not expla in why the c o l l a t e r a l in that case was sold for less 
than ha l f of the amount of t h e i r own a p p r a i s a l s e v e r a l months 
b e f o r e . However, in the ins tan t case, the c o l l a t e r a l was sold in 
or\ 
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t h e v e r y r a n g e in w h i c h a d i s i n t e r e s t e d t h i r d - p a r t y e x p e r t * 
w i tne s s t e s t i f i e d was "very r e a s o n a b l e . " 
Defendants c i t e Chi t t enden T r u s t Co, v . M a r y a n s k i , 415 
A.2d 206 ( V t . 1 9 8 0 ) , fo r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f s did not A 
make a g o o d - f a i t h e f f o r t to maximize the va lue of the c o l l a t e r a l . 
The C h i t t e n d e n c o u r t i t s e l f s t a t e s t he s p e c i f i c s of the duty to 
s e l l in a commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e manner c a n n o t be m e a n i n g f u l l y ' 
d e s c r i b e d e x c e p t in t e r m s of p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s i t u a t i o n s . The 
t r i a l cou r t in Ch i t t enden f a i l e d t o make f i n d i n g s of f a c t which 
made i t d i f f i c u l t for the a p p e l l a t e cou r t to under s t and the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s r e a s o n i n g . Also, the Chi t t enden c o u r t in a d d r e s s i n g t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n of commercial r e a s o n a b l e n e s s s t a t e s "we 
can f i n d no p o s s i b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t wou ld 
s u p p o r t t h e m i n i m a l f i n d i n g s n e c e s s a r y t o r e a c h s u c h a 
c o n c l u s i o n . " C h i t t e n d e n , 415 A.2d a t 209 . F i n a l l y , a s opposed 
t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e c r e d i t o r comple te ly f a i l e d to c a r r y i t s 
burden of showing a commerc ia l ly r e a s o n a b l e s a l e . For e x a m p l e , 
the Chi t t enden cour t s t a t e d : 
I 
The p l a i n t i f f ' s p r i n c i p a l 
w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e 
was an o u t s t a n d i n g b a l a n c e on 
the indeb tedness of $ 2 7 , 5 1 7 . 1 5 , 
p l u s $ 8 , 4 0 3 . 1 5 i n t e r e s t through 
A p r i l 2 7 , 1 9 7 9 . The w i t n e s s < 
d i d no t know in what o r d e r the 
i tems of c o l l a t e r a l were s o l d , 
w h e t h e r t h e y w e r e s o l d by 
p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e s a l e , how 
m u c h w a s r e a l i z e d on e a c h 
p a r t i c u l a r i t e m , who s o l d them i 
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o r t o whom t h e y were s o l d , or 
wha t was c r e d i t e d t o d e f e n -
dan t y s a c c o u n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , 
t h e w i t n e s s d id no t e v e n know 
w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e d 
n o t i c e of t h e s a l e s , e x c e p t 
t h a t he f e l t c e r t a i n t h a t t h e 
d e f e n d a n t was "made a w a r e " of 
t h e s a l e s e i t h e r by n o t i c e "or 
through a d v e r t i s i n g . " 
C h i t t e n d e n , 415 A.2d a t 209. 
C l e a r l y , p l a i n t i f f in t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , as opposed to 
p l a i n t i f f in C h i t t e n d e n , went we l l beyond minimal r e q u i r e m e n t s in 
showing t h e s a l e of t h e c o l l a t e r a l was commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e . 
Chi t t enden simply i s not on p o i n t . 
Fur thermore , in In r e Hamby, 19 B.R. 776 ( B a n k r . N.D. 
A l a . 1 9 8 2 ) , t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t was f a c e d w i t h an o u t r a g e o u s 
f ac t s i t u a t i o n d e a l i n g with a consumer i tem, namely an au tomob i l e . 
The a u t o m o b i l e was r e p o s s e s s e d by t h e c r e d i t o r a t the d e b t o r ' s 
work p lace wi thout her knowledge. Upon l e a v i n g work a t 9 :00 p .m. 
d e b t o r d i s c o v e r e d t h a t he r c a r was gone and she had no way of 
g e t t i n g home. A l s o , t h e c o u r t c l e a r l y i m p l i e d t h e r e may have 
been a " s w e e t h e a r t " d e a l i n v o l v e d in t h e c a s e w h e r e i n t h e 
r e p o s s e s s i n g c r e d i t o r and t h e t h i r d - p a r t y p u r c h a s e r a t t h e 
r e p o s s e s s i o n s a l e may have been g u i l t y of c o l l u s i o n . On t h e 
b a s i s of t h e s e f a c t s and o t h e r s , t h e c o u r t h e l d t h e s a l e of t h e 
c o l l a t e r a l commercia l ly u n r e a s o n a b l e . In the i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e r e 
i s no a l l e g a t i o n or e v i d e n c e of s e l f - d e a l i n g o r bad f a i t h . 
The re fo re , Hambly i s not h e l p f u l to de fendan t s 1 c a s e . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P e o p l e ' s A c c e p t a n c e C o r p . v. Van Epps, 60 Ohio App. 2d i 
100, 395 N .E .2d 912 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a t l e a s t two 
c a s e s c i t e d by d e f e n d a n t s . P e o p l e ' s Acceptance again d e a l t with 
a consumer p r o d u c t and a l l e g a t i o n s of s e l f - d e a l i n g a g a i n s t t h e ^ 
s e c u r e d p a r t y . In t h e i r b r i e f , defendants quote from page 916 of 
the case and r e p r e s e n t s a i d q u o t e a s a h o l d i n g of t h e P e o p l e y s 
A c c e p t a n c e c o u r t . However, c l o s e r examinat ion r e v e a l s the quote ' 
i n d e f e n d a n t s ' b r i e f i s n o t t h e h o l d i n g o f t h e P e o p l e ' s 
Acceptance c o u r t , but a r e f e r e n c e to a h o l d i n g in t h e c a s e of 
C e n t r a l B u d g e t C o r p . v . G a r r e t t , 368 N . Y . S . 2 d 268 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . j 
P l a i n t i f f does no t i n t e n d to unduly c r i t i c i z e d e f e n d a n t s ' b r i e f . 
However , s u c h a d i s c r e p a n c y a s p o i n t e d o u t a b o v e s u p p o r t s 
p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t s ' cases a r e not on p o i n t . 
D e f e n d a n t s a l s o c i t e Wayne Bank v . P o r e , 119 M i c h . 
App . 6 3 4 , 326 N.W.2d 588 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 
p l a i n t i f f ' s d e c i s i o n not to a s s e r t i t s r i g h t s in t h e c o l l a t e r a l 
a g a i n s t t h e r e c e i v e r or t r u s t e e in b a n k r u p t c y was commercial ly 
u n r e a s o n a b l e . Wayne Bank, however , d id no t even d e a l w i t h t h e 
i s s u e of commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n under UCC § 9 - 5 0 4 ( 3 ) . 
The c a s e a d d r e s s e d t h e g e n e r a l good f a i t h and r e a s o n a b l e n e s s 
s t a n d a r d s u n d e r UCC § 9 - 1 0 2 ( 3 ) . The Wayne Bank c o u r t was 
A 
p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e g u a r a n t o r ' s s u b r o g a t i o n r i g h t s 
a g a i n s t t h e d e b t o r and how t h o s e r i g h t s a r e a f f e c t e d by t h e 
secured p a r t y ' s a c t i o n s . S ince Wayne Bank did not even d e a l w i t h 
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t h e p r o v i s i o n of t h e UCC i n v o l v e d in t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , i t s 
r a t i o n a l i s t o t a l l y i n a p p l i c a b l e in t h i s c a s e . 
F i n a l l y , de fendan t s c i t e two Wyoming c a s e s , A i m o n e t t o 
v . K e e p e s , 501 P . 2 d 1017 (Wyo. 1972) and Eggeman v . Wes te rn 
Na t iona l Bank, 596 P.2d 318 (Wyo. 1979), for the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 
p l a i n t i f f i s a b s o l u t e l y ba r r ed from seek ing a d e f i c i e n c y judgment 
u n d e r Wyoming l a w . H o w e v e r , e a c h of t h e a b o v e c a s e s a r e 
f a c t u a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the i n s t a n t c a s e . For example, in 
Aimonetto t h e r e was no p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t y i n v o l v e d and t h e c a s e 
d e a l t w i t h a s i n g l e d i a m o n d b r a c e l e t and n o t a m i r i a d of 
i n s t a l l e d equ ipmen t in an ongo ing b u s i n e s s . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e 
c o u r t in A i m o n e t t o a d d r e s s e d t h e a l l e g e d c o n v e r s i o n of t h e 
diamond b r a c e l e t and no t w i th a t t e m p t s by t h e s e c u r e d p a r t y t o 
ob ta in a d e f i c i e n c y judgment. 
In Eggeman , t h e c o u r t d e a l t w i th a j u d i c i a l s a l e of 
bo th r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y by a s h e r i f f . The c o u r t in 
Eggeman n e v e r a d d r e s s e d the i s s u e of a secured p a r t y ' s r i g h t and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o d i s p o s e o f r e p o s s e s s e d p r o p e r t y i n a 
commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e manner under UCC 9 -504 (3 ) . 
In c o n c l u s i o n , i t i s c l e a r d e f e n d a n t s mus t r e l y on 
no th ing more than t h e i r unsuppor t ab l e and s e l f - s e r v i n g a s s e r t i o n s . 
I t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h e e v i d e n c e of a c o m m e r c i a l l y 
r e a s o n a b l e s a l e c l e a r l y p r e p o n d e r a t e s in i t s f a v o r and t h e 
d e f i c i e n c y judgment of the d i s t r i c t cou r t should be a f f i rmed . 
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POINT I I A 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING A DEFICIENCY 
JUDGMENT SIMPLY BECAUSE THE DISPOSITION OF ONE PIECE OF 
THE COLLATERAL WAS FOUND TO BE COMMERCIALLY UNREASONABLE. 
I n P o i n t I I o f t h e i r b r i e f , d e f e n d a n t s a r g u e t h e ^ 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d in a w a r d i n g any d e f i c i e n c y j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e 
i t h a d h e l d t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f a s i n g l e wood c a r v i n g was 
c o m m e r c i a l l y u n r e a s o n a b l e . I t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h e ^ 
c o m m e r c i a l l y u n r e a s o n a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h a t o n e wood c a r v i n g 
does n o t b a r a d e f i c i e n c y j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t s w e r e n o t 
h a r m e d t h e r e b y . The f o r e g o i n g c o n c l u s i o n i s b a s e d on t h e . ' 
f o l l o w i n g t h r e e p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
F i r s t , a c o m m e r c i a l l y u n r e a s o n a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n of p a r t 
of t h e c o l l a t e r a l d o e s n o t p r e v e n t t h e c o m m e r c i a l l y r e a s o n a b l e 
d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e r e m a i n d e r or ba r a d e f i c i e n c y judgment a g a i n s t 
t h e d e b t o r . F o r e x a m p l e , in In r e N e l l i s , 22 UCC R e p o r t i n g 
S e r v i c e 1318 ( 1 9 7 7 ) , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t h e 
E a s t e r n D i s t r i c t o f P e n n s y l v a n i a a d d r e s s e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f 
w h e t h e r t h e s a l e of t h e d e b t o r ' s s e c u r e d p r o p e r t y was consummated 
i 
i n a c o m m e r c i a l l y r e a s o n a b l e m a n n e r . T h e d e b t o r w a s a 
d i s t r i b u t o r o f m a r i n e goods and h a r d w a r e , one of a p p r o x i m a t e l y a 
d o z e n s u c h b u s i n e s s e s l o c a t e d i n t h e r e g i o n . As a r e s u l t o f 
i 
financial difficulties, a creditor of the debtor foreclosed on 
the inventory and arranged for its bulk sale. The court found 
the sale of part of the collateral was commercially unreasonable 
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unde r UCC § 9 - 5 0 4 ( 3 ) , bu t t h a t f i n d i n g did not p reven t the cou r t 
from h o l d i n g t h a t t h e s a l e of t h e r e m a i n i n g c o l l a t e r a l was 
commercial ly r e a s o n a b l e . 
S e c o n d , t h e d e f e n d a n t s w e r e n o t h a r m e d by t h e 
c o m m e r c i a l l y u n r e a s o n a b l e s a l e of t h e wood c a r v i n g b e c a u s e 
d e f e n d a n t s were a l l o w e d a s e t o f f in t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Ten 
Thousand D o l l a r s ( $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) , which was t h e p r i c e d e f e n d a n t s 
o r i g i n a l l y p a i d f o r t h e wood c a r v i n g . T h e r e f o r e , d e f e n d a n t s 
a sk t h i s Cour t t o r e l i e v e them of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y u n d e r 
p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t i e s , even though the d i s t r i c t cou r t remedied the 
a l l e g e d d i s c r e p a n c y by a l l o w i n g a s e t o f f f o r t h e o r i g i n a l s a l e 
p r i c e of t h e wood c a r v i n g . I t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h i s cour t 
should d e c l i n e d e f e n d a n t s ' r e q u e s t . 
T h i r d , t h e c a s e s c i t e d by d e f e n d a n t s a l l e g e d l y 
s u p p o r t i n g t h e i r a rgumen t a r e d i s t i n q u i s h a b l e from the i n s t a n t 
c a s e and f a i l t o s u p p o r t d e f e n d a n t s 1 a s s e r t i o n . For e x a m p l e , 
d e f e n d a n t s c i t e DeLay F i r s t Nat . B. & Tr . v . Jacobson Appl iance , 
196 Neb. 398 , 243 N.W.2d 745 ( 1 9 7 6 ) , f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h e 
c o m m e r c i a l l y u n r e a s o n a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n of p a r t of the c o l l a t e r a l 
c o m p l e t e l y b a r s any d e f i c i e n c y j u d g m e n t . I t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s 
p o s i t i o n DeLay i s so f a c t u a l l y and l e g a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from 
the p r e s e n t case t h a t i t i s not h e l p f u l t o d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . 
For e x a m p l e , in DeLay t h e e x c l u s i v e i s s u e r e l a t i v e t o t h e 
commercial r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of the s a l e was t h e c r e d i t o r ' s f a i l u r e 
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to give notice to the debtors. The"creditor conducted five 
separate sales transactions to dispose of the collateral. For 
three of the five sales, the creditor gave no notice at all to 
the debtors. In the two remaining sales, questionable and 
defective notice was given to the debtors. Furthermore, the 
court in DeLay did not even address the issue of commercially 
reasonable disposition under UCC § 9-504(3). Finally, two 
justices in DeLay dissented by stating: 
/ F i r s t , I c a n n o t a g r e e t h a t 
where c o l l a t e r a l i s d i sposed of 
in a s e r i e s of s a l e s , f a i l u r e 
t o g i v e n o t i c e of one such s a l e 
d e p r i v e s t h e h o l d e r o f t h e 
s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t of a l l r i g h t 
t o a d e f i c i e n c y j u d g m e n t and 
t h e r i g h t t o r e l y u p o n a 
gua ran ty , even though a l l s a l e s 
a r e c o n d u c t e d in a commercial ly 
r e a s o n a b l e manner and t h e l a c k 
o f n o t i c e c a u s e d no l o s s 
wha teve r . 
DeLay, 243 N . W . 2 d a t 752. 
F i n a l l y , d e f e n d a n t s c i t e the Wyoming case Jackson S t a t e 
Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1978), f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 
Wyoming l aw b a r s p l a i n t i f f ' s p r e s e n t d e f i c i e n c y j u d g m e n t . 
J a c k s o n does no t a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e i n v o l v e d in t h e p r e s e n t 
a c t i o n and does no t h o l d a s d e f e n d a n t s 1 r e p r e s e n t . In Jackson, 
t h e s e c u r e d p a r t y i t s e l f p u r c h a s e d t h e p r o p e r t y a t a p r i v a t e 
s a l e . The c o u r t noted t h a t UCC § 9-504(3) a l lows a secured p a r t y 
t o purchase a t a p r i v a t e s a l e only i f t he c o l l a t e r a l i s of a t y p e 
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c u s t o m a r i l y so ld in a recognized market or is of a type which is 
the subject of widely d i s t r i bu t ed standard pr ice q u o t a t i o n s . The 
c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e s e c u r e d p a r t y v i o l a t e d the commercia l ly 
reasonable standard because the c o l l a t e r a l in t h a t case was not 
the type of c o l l a t e r a l which the Code allows the secured party to 
purchase a t i t s own s a l e . The Jackson cour t did not hold t h a t 
the secured p a r t y was bar red from seeking a deficiency judgment 
because one or more pieces of c o l l a t e r a l were improperly d isposed 
of. Based on the above d i s c u s s i o n , i t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s posi t ion 
Jackson is t o t a l l y i r r e l evan t to the present case . 
Based on the fo regoing d i s c u s s i o n , t h i s Court should 
a f f i r m t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e s a l e of t h e 
c o l l a t e r a l was commercially reasonable . 
POINT I I I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING DEFENDANTS' PERSONAL GUARANTIES INTO EVIDENCE. 
In Point III of their brief, defendants contend the 
personal guaranties at issue were erroneously admitted upon 
inadequate foundation. They further argue, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-25-17 (1953)(see, Addendum, Exhibit "F"), the guaranties 
were altered by adding the date and lease number after their 
execution and that plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proof 
under that statute for admission of the guaranties into evidence. 
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D e f e n d a n t s ' a r g u m e n t s a r e w i t h o u t m e r i t f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g { 
r e a s o n s . 
A. D e f e n d a n t s 1 p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t i e s were p r o p e r l y 
admi t t ed as b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s . ' 
I t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a c t e d 
w e l l w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n in a d m i t t i n g d e f e n d a n t s ' p e r s o n a l 
g u a r a n t i e s as b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s under the Utah Rules of Evidence , 
t he J u d i c i a l Code, and s e v e r a l d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Cour t . 
- . ; The newly a d o p t e d Utah. R u l e s of E v i d e n c e c o n t a i n a 
r e l a t i v e l y l i b e r a l s t a n d a r d for the admiss ion of b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s 
i n t o e v i d e n c e . Ru le 803 of t h e U tah R u l e s of E v i d e n c e , in 
p e r t i n e n t p a r t , s t a t e s as f o l l o w s : 
i 
The f o l l o w i n g a r e no t e x c l u d e d 
by t h e h e r e s a y r u l e , e v e n 
t h o u g h t h e d e c l a r a n t i s 
a v a i l a b l e as a w i t n e s s : 
* * * 
6* R e c o r d s o f R e g u l a r l y 
C o n d u c t e d A c t i v i t y . A 
memorandum, r e p o r t , r e c o r d , or 
da ta c o m p i l a t i o n , in any form, 
of a c t s , e v e n t s , c o n d i t i o n s , 
o p i n i o n s or d i a g n o s i s , made a t 
o r n e a r t h e t i m e b y , or from 
i n f o r m a t i o n t r a n s m i t t e d b y , a 
p e r s o n w i t h k n o w l e d g e , i f kept 
in t h e c o u r s e of a r e g u l a r l y 
c o n d u c t e d b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t y , 
and i f i t was a r e g u l a r p r a c -
t i c e of t h a t b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t y 
to make the memorandum, r e p o r t , 
r e c o r d , or d a t a c o m p i l a t i o n , 
a l l a s shown by t h e t e s t i m o n y 
o f t h e c u s t o d i a n o r o t h e r 
q u a l i f i e d w i t n e s s . . . . 
i 
i 
i 
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See, Addendum, Exh ib i t "G." 
R u l e 803 a p p l i e s a " b r o a d - b r u s h " a p p r o a c h t o t h e 
admiss ion of b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s . The r u l e does no t g i v e s p e c i f i c 
and d e t a i l e d gu idance . 
However, when read in con junc t ion with Utah Code Ann. § 
78-25-16 .5 ( 1983) ( see , Addendum, E x h i b i t " H " ) , i t becomes c l e a r 
d e f e n d a n t s 1 a rgumen t of inadequa te foundat ion goes to the weight 
to be given the pe r sona l g u a r a n t i e s and not to the a d m i s s i b i l i t y . 
Sec t ion 78-25-16 .5 s t a t e s as f o l l o w s : 
Bus ines s r e c o r d - a d m i s s i b i l i t y -
we igh t . 
( 1 ) As u s e d i n t h i s 
s e c t i o n , " b u s i n e s s " i n c l u d e s 
b u s i n e s s e s , p r o f e s s i o n , 
o c c u p a t i o n , a n d c a l l i n g o f 
every k ind . 
(2 ) In any c o u r t in t h i s 
s t a t e , any w r i t i n g or r e c o r d , 
whe the r in t h e form of an e n t r y 
in a book or o t h e r w i s e , made as 
a memorandum o r r e c o r d of any 
a c t , t r a n s a c t i o n , o c c u r r e n c e , 
o r e v e n t , s h a l l be a d m i s s i b l e 
a s e v i d e n c e o f t h a t a c t , 
t r a n s a c t i o n , o c c u r r e n c e , o r 
e v e n t , i f made in t h e r e g u l a r 
c o u r s e of any b u s i n e s s , and i f 
i t was t h e r e g u l a r c o u r s e of 
t h e b u s i n e s s t o m a k e t h e 
memorandum or r e c o r d a t t h e 
t i m e of t h e a c t , t r a n s a c t i o n , 
o c c u r r e n c e , or e v e n t or w i t h i n 
a r e a s o n a b l e t ime t h e r e a f t e r . 
( 3 ) A l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
o t h e r t h a n t h o s e s e t f o r t h in 
s u b s e c t i o n (2) of t h e making of 
t h e w r i t i n g or r e c o r d , i n c l u d -
ing l a c k of p e r s o n a l knowledge 
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4 
shown to affect its weight, but 
those circumstances do not 
affect its admissibility, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-16.5 (1983) (emphasis added). 
It is plaintiff's position Section 78-25-16.5 of the 
Utah Judicial Code is not in conflict with the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and therefore is pertinent to this Court's consideration 
of the admissibility of the personal guaranties as business 
records. Section 78-25-16.5 merely gives more specific and 
detailed guidance to district and appellate courts. Therefore, 
the personal guaranties at issue in this case were properly 
admitted into evidence as business records kept in the regular 
course of plaintiff's business if the district court believed Ms. 
Rakes had laid a proper foundation for their admissibility. All 
other considerations, namely, the insertion of dates and lease 
numbers on the guaranties after their execution and Ms. Rakes' 
lack of personal knowledge about those dates and lease numbers, 
go to the weight to be given the evidence, not to its admissi-
bility. 
Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence has not yet been 
interpreted by this Court, but case law interpreting the former 
Utah Rule of Evidence may be helpful and is submitted for this 
Court's consideration. For example, in State v. Marquez, 560 
P.2d 342 (Utah 1977), a fingerprint record was made of the 
defendant and testimony showed that the record was made during 
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the regular course of business, filed and ultimately removed from 
the file and identified by a witness at the time of trial. In 
addressing the defendant's argument the fingerprint record was 
admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation, this Court 
stated: 
I t i s t h e p r e r o g a t i v e of t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t t o d e t e r m i n e when 
s u c h f o u n d a t i o n i s l a i d and 
s u f f i c i e n t s h o w i n g o f t h e 
c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e e v i d e n c e i s 
e s t a b l i s h e d . The r u l i n g of t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t in t h i s r ega rd w i l l 
not be o v e r t u r n e d u n l e s s t h e r e 
i s a s h o w i n g of an a b u s e 
of d i s c r e t i o n . 
M a r q u e z , 560 P . 2 d a t 3 ^ 2 - 3 4 3 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ; s ee a l s o , 
C a r p e n t e r Paper Co. v . B rannock , 14 Utah 2d 34, 376 P . 2 d 939 
( 1 9 6 2 ) ( i t i s p r e r o g a t i v e of t r i a l c o u r t t o d e t e r m i n e whe the r 
foundat ion i s l a i d for admission of bus ine s s r e c o r d s ) . 
In a p p l y i n g t h e law d i s c u s s e d above t o t h e f a c t s of 
t h i s c a s e , i t becomes c l e a r the d i s t r i c t cou r t ac t ed wel l wi th in 
i t s d i s c r e t i o n in a d m i t t i n g d e f e n d a n t s ' p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t i e s i n t o 
e v i d e n c e a s b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s . Ms. B. J . R a k e s 1 t e s t i m o n y 
r e g a r d i n g the g u a r a n t y e x h i b i t marked as E x h i b i t 2-P s e r v e d as 
f o u n d a t i o n f o r a d m i s s i o n i n t o t e s t i m o n y of a l l t h e p e r s o n a l 
g u a r a n t i e s as bus ines s r e c o r d s . Ms. Rakes t e s t i f i e d she has been 
employed by p l a i n t i f f s i n c e J a n u a r y 4, 1984 . In r e s p o n s e t o 
d e f e n d a n t s ' o b j e c t i o n to her t e s t imony s e r v i n g as f o u n d a t i o n fo r 
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a d m i s s i o n of the g u a r a n t i e s as bus ines s r e c o r d s , she t e s t i f i e d as 
f o l l o w s : 
Q. B . J . , i s t h i s t h e o n l y 
a c c o u n t t h a t you w e r e c o l -
l e c t i n g for the company? 
A. No. 
Q. The o t h e r accoun t s t h a t you 
w e r e c o l l e c t i n g - h o w m a n y 
a c c o u n t s a r e you c o l l e c t i n g for 
t h i s c o m p a n y a t t h i s t i m e ? 
A p p r o x i m a t e l y , in r o u n d num-
bers . 
A. Lease documents? 
Q. MM-HMM. 
' / A. P r o b a b l y — I ' m in c h a r g e of * 
a depar tment t h a t handles 800. ' ' 
Q. Of t h o s e 800 l e a s e d o c u -
m e n t s a p p r o x i m a t e l y how many 
w e r e s i g n e d on o r b e f o r e 
19 8 1 , 19 8 0 t h a t y o u a r e 
h a n d l i n g r i g h t now i n t h e 
c o l l e c t i o n ? 
A. Mos t of t h e o n e s t h a t I 
have now would be s i g n e d a t a 
l a t e r da t e? 
Q. So pe rcen tage w i se . 
A. Twen ty - f ive . 
Q. Twenty-f ive p e r c e n t of 8 0 0 . 
So approx imate ly 200 cases? 
A. MM-HMM. 
Q. And you h a v e t a l k e d w i t h 
i n d i v i d u a l s who s i g n e d t h e s e 
documents? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you t a l k e d t o them 
a b o u t wha t t h e p r o c e d u r e was 
t h e y used a s t h e y s i g n e d those 
documents? 
A. B a s i c a l l y I ' v e t a l k e d t o 
them, d i s c u s s e d c o l l e c t i n g t h e 
a c c o u n t s . And a t t imes i t does 
come up as t o t h e t r a n s a c t i o n s 
t h a t fo l lowed . 
Q. I s i t y o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
t h e n t h a t t h e t r a n s a c t i o n or 
p r a c t i c e s t h a t have been t o l d 
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you d u r i n g t h o s e t i m e s a r e 
d i f f e r e n t f r o m w h a t y o u 
e x p e r i e n c e today a t IFG Leasing 
Company? 
A. No. 
Tr. 22-24 (emphasis added), 
Ms. Rakes testimony shows she was the proper custodian 
of the personal guaranty documents and her testimony certainly 
serves as adequate foundation for their admission as business 
records. Furthermore, Mr. Marshall, in referring to the personal 
guaranties in question and other IFG documents, stated: 
I f m n o t o b j e c t i n g t o t h e 
d o c u m e n t s a s b e i n g b u s i n e s s 
r e c o r d s of the company. T h a t ' s 
not the p o i n t . 
T r . 20 (emphasis a d d e d ) . 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , based on Ms. Rakes1 t e s t imony and on Mr. 
M a r s h a l l ' s s t a t emen t quoted above, Judge B i l l i n g s s t a t e d : 
The o b j e c t i o n w i l l be o v e r r u l e d 
and E x h i b i t 1 w i l l be r e c e i v e d 
a s a b u s i n e s s r e c o r d w i t h t h e 
p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n h a v i n g been 
l a i d . 
Tr . 28 (emphasis a d d e d ) . 
F i n a l l y , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g a l l of t h e e v i d e n c e and 
t e s t i m o n y p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l , J u d g e B i l l i n g s made s e v e r a l 
p e r t i n e n t o b s e r v a t i o n s in her memorandum d e c i s i o n : 
T h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e 
g u a r a n t i e s i n q u e s t i o n 
( E x h i b i t s 2, 9, 16, 2 3 , and 30) 
were i n t e n d e d by the p a r t i e s to 
g u a r a n t e e t h e l e a s e s e n t e r e d 
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i n t o by B o n n e v i l l e ( E x h i b i t s 1, 
8, 15, 22 , and 2 9 ) . The Cour t 
i s p u r s u a d e d t h a t t h e g u a r a n -
t e e s w e r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h 
e a c h l e a s e t r a n s a c t i o n . 
A l t h o u g h t h e s e d o c u m e n t s may 
h a v e been b l a n k a s t o l e a s e 
n u m b e r , d a t e , a n d e v e n t h e 
e q u i p m e n t c o v e r e d , t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s e i t h e r knew o r 
s h o u l d h; 
d o c u m e n t s 
a v e k 
were 
f i v e l e a s e s a t 
n own t h 
i n t e n d e d 
a t 
for 
i s s u e i n 
t h e 
• t h e 
t h i s 
l i t i g a t i o n . The d e f e n d a n t s a t 
t h e t i m e t h e y e x e c u t e d t h e s e 
g u a r a n t e e s had no o t h e r b u s i -
n e s s w i t h t h e p l a i n t i f f , and 
t h u s c o u l d only have cons ide red 
t h a t t h e g u a r a n t e e s were f o r 
l e a s e s for the Ramada Inn . 
R. 206; s e e , Addendum, Exh ib i t "B" (emphasis a d d e d ) . 
In c o n c l u s i o n , i t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n d e f e n d a n t s 1 
a r g u m e n t s r e g a r d i n g t h e c i r cums tances under which the g u a r a n t i e s 
were s i g n e d go t o t h e w e i g h t t h e c o u r t s h o u l d h a v e g i v e n t h e 
p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t i e s and no t t o t h e i r a d m i s s i b i l i t y as bus ines s 
r e c o r d s . 
B. P l a i n t i f f met i t s burden of p r o o f under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-25-17 for admiss ion of d e f e n d a n t s ' p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t i e s 
as bus ines s r e c o r d s . 
I t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n the d a t e s and l e a s e numbers 
on the r e s p e c t i v e pe r sona l g u a r a n t i e s were added to t h e documents 
a f t e r t h e i r e x e c u t i o n w i t h t h e c o n s e n t of t h e p a r t i e s and a l s o 
t h a t the a d d i t i o n s do not change t h e meaning or l a n g u a g e of t h e 
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p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t i e s . D e f e n d a n t s c i t e Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-17 
( 1 9 7 7 ) ( s e e , Addendum, E x h i b i t f f F f l ) , a r g u i n g t h e p e r s o n a l 
g u a r a n t i e s s h o u l d no t have been a d m i t t e d b e c a u s e p l a i n t i f f did 
no t c a r r y i t s bu rden of p r o o f u n d e r t h a t s t a t u t e . S e c t i o n 
78-25-17 s t a t e s as f o l l o w s : 
The p a r t y p r o d u c i n g as genuine 
a w r i t i n g w h i c h h a s b e e n 
a l t e r e d , or a p p e a r s t o h a v e 
been a l t e r e d a f t e r i t s e x e c u -
t i o n in a p a r t m a t e r i a l t o the 
q u e s t i o n in d i s p u t e mus t a c -
c o u n t f o r t h e a p p e a r a n c e of 
a l t e r a t i o n . He may show t h a t 
t h e a l t e r a t i o n was made by 
a n o t h e r w i t h o u t h i s c o n c u r -
r e n c e , o r was made w i t h t h e 
consent of the p a r t i e s a f f e c t e d 
by i t , or o t h e r w i s e p r o p e r l y or 
i n n o c e n t l y made , o r t h a t t h e 
a l t e r a t i o n does no t change the 
m e a n i n g o r l a n g u a g e of t h e 
i n s t r u m e n t . I f he does t h i s , 
he may g i v e t h e w r i t i n g i n 
ev idence , but not o t h e r w i s e . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-17 (1977) (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's research uncovered one case interpreting 
Section 78-25-17. In Hartman v. Young, 551 P.2d 229 (Utah 1976), 
this Court dealt with the admissibility of an altered contract. 
The appellant entered into a contract to purchase a dairy farm 
from the respondents. The contract was typed with several blank 
spaces to be filled in when the parties reached final agreement. 
In two places, the typed part of the contract was changed and 
initialed by all parties. However, the difficulty in the case 
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< 
a r o s e from an u n i n i t i a l e d c h a n g e of t h e t y p e d p a r t of t h e * 
c o n t r a c t which a f f e c t e d the i n t e r e s t on t h e u n p a i d b a l a n c e . One 
of t h e i s s u e s before t h i s Court was whether a p p e l l a n t c a r r i e d i t s 
burden under S e c t i o n 7 8 - 2 5 - 1 7 in o r d e r t o admi t h i s v e r s i o n of ^ 
t h e c o n t r a c t i n t o e v i d e n c e . This Court made s e v e r a l i n t e r e s t i n g 
o b s e r v a t i o n s : 
A p p a r e n t l y he made a p r ima ' 
f a c i e showing s u f f i c i e n t l y i n 
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e s t a t u t e to 
a d m i t t h e d o c u m e n t , s i n c e i t 
w a s r e c e i v e d i n e v i d e n c e . 
However, t h e q u e s t i o n of i t s • | 
v a l i d i t y i s a m a t t e r t o be 
de t e rmined by t h e t r i e r of t h e 
f ac t . . . 
Hartman, 551 P.2d at 231 (emphasis added). 
In applying the above law to the facts of this case, it 
becomes apparent plaintiff carried its prima facie burden of 
proof under Section 78-25-17 and the district court properly 
admitted the personal guaranties into evidence. For example, 
under cross-examination by Mr. Barber, Ms. Rakes testified it was 
in the ordinary course of plaintiff's business to add the lease 
I 
numbers to the g u a r a n t i e s a f t e r t h e l e a s e s were e x e c u t e d . T r . 
5 6 - 5 7 . D e f e n d a n t s we re f a m i l i a r w i t h p l a i n t i f f ' s c o u r s e of 
bus ine s s in t h i s r e g a r d . 
i 
Furthermore, Judge Billings in Finding Number 5 of her 
findings of fact and conclusions of law stated: 
I 
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T h a t on or a b o u t t h e d a t e s of 
t h e e x e c u t i o n of e a c h of t h e 
f i v e l e a s e s , e a c h o f t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s , Hansen , 
Gordon, and N e l s o n , e x e c u t e d a 
c o n t i n u i n g and u n c o n d i t i o n a l 
g u a r a n t y agreement whereby they 
a g r e e d t o p e r f o r m , p a y , a n d 
d i s c h a r g e a l l of t h e de fendan t 
Bonnev i l l e Development C o r p o r a -
t i o n ' s o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r t h e 
r e s p e c t i v e l e a s e ag reemen t s . 
R. 216-217; s e e , Addendum, Exh ib i t "A." 
T h e r e f o r e , a f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e t e s t i m o n y and 
e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l and t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t , i t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h e d a t e s and l e a s e numbers 
added t o t h e p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t i e s were added with the d e f e n d a n t s ' 
c o n s e n t and k n o w l e d g e . F i n a l l y , p l a i n t i f f a l s o c o n t e n d s 
d e f e n d a n t s i n t e n d e d t h e p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t i e s to apply to the f ive 
l e a s e s in q u e s t i o n and t h e r e f o r e t h e a d d e d d a t e s and l e a s e 
numbers d id no t a l t e r t h e meaning or l a n g u a g e of t h e p e r s o n a l 
g u a r a n t i e s . Consequent ly , p l a i n t i f f c l e a r l y c a r r i e d i t s burden 
of p r o o f under Sec t ion 78-25-17 and the d i s t r i c t cour t ac t ed we l l 
w i th in i t s d i s c r e t i o n in a d m i t t i n g the g u a r a n t i e s i n t o ev idence . 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INCLUDED THE RESIDUAL VALUE 
OF THE COLLATERAL AS PART OF THE DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT. 
In Point IV of their brief, defendants conveniently 
overlook the stipulation they entered into at trial and argue the 
residual value was established merely to determine if the leases 
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i 
were in r e a l i t y f i n a n c i n g a g r e e m e n t s s u b j e c t t o t h e Uniform I 
Commercia l Code. I t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h e d e f e n d a n t s 
e n t e r e d i n t o a s t i p u l a t i o n a t t r i a l c a l l i n g fo r t h e r e s i d u a l 
va lue of the c o l l a t e r a l t o be inc luded in any d e f i c i e n c y judgment i 
as p a r t of p l a i n t i f f ' s b e n e f i t of i t s barga in under the l e a s e s . 
In s u p p o r t of i t s p o s i t i o n , p l a i n t i f f c i t e s t h e 
c o n v e r s a t i o n a t t r i a l b e t w e e n Mr. R e a d i n g and Mr. M a r s h a l l * 
r e g a r d i n g the s t i p u l a t i o n : 
Mr. R e a d i n g : Your Honor, t h e r e 
a r e two s t i p u l a t i o n s t h a t c o u n -
s e l h a s a g r e e d t o in chambers . ^ 
with your Honor. The f i r s t one 
i s t h a t t h e y have a g r e e d t h a t 
as a p a r t of the l e a s e documen-
t a t i o n and b e n e f i t of I F G ' s 
ba rga in was t h a t t h e equ ipmen t 
had a r e s i d u a l v a l u e , or t h e ' 
va lue a t t h e end of t h e l e a s e , 
of a t l e a s t f i v e p e r c e n t . I 
t h i n k t h a t ' s i n c o r p o r a t e d in 
d e f e n d a n t s ' E x h i b i t 48 or 4 9 . 
And so t h a t amoun t t o t a l f o r . 
a l l t h r e e l e a s e s i s $23 ,805 .65 . 
Mr . M a r s h a l 1 : T h a t i s w h a t 
f i v e p e r c e n t i s s u p p o s e d t o 
r e p r e s e n t ? 
Mr. R e a d i n g : Yea, f ive pe rcen t 
of the equipment c o s t , o r i g i n a l -
equipment c o s t . 
M r . M a r s h a l l : I w o n ' t 
s t i p u l a t e as to the amount , bu t 
I w i l l s t i p u l a t e t o t h e f i v e 
pe r cen t t h a t we agreed on. 
T r . 85-86 (emphasis a d d e d ) . 
Even though Mr. M a r s h a l l s t a t e d he would not s t i p u l a t e 
to the s p e c i f i c amount of $ 2 3 , 8 0 5 . 6 5 , he d i d s t i p u l a t e t h a t t h e 
I 
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r e s i d u a l v a l u e of t h e c o l l a t e r a l was f i v e p e r c e n t (5%) of i t s 
o r i g i n a l c o s t . The o r i g i n a l c o s t o f t h e c o l l a t e r a l was 
i n t r o d u c e d in e v i d e n c e a s t o t a l l i n g $476 ,113 .11- Tr . 332. Five 
p e r c e n t (5*) of $476,113.11 i s $23,8.05.65. 
Based on t h e above e v i d e n c e and c a l c u l a t i o n s , J u d g e 
B i l l i n g s found as a f i n d i n g of f a c t the f o l l o w i n g : 
As a p a r t o f p l a i n t i f f ' s 
b a r g a i n , i t had e s t a b l i s h e d 
r e s i d u a l o r s a l v a g e v a l u e in 
t h e e q u i p m e n t of Twen ty -Three 
T h o u s a n d E i g h t H u n d r e d F i v e 
D o l l a r s and S i x t y - F i v e Cen t s 
( $ 2 3 , 8 0 5 . 6 5 ) . 
R. 218; see, Addendum, Exibit "A" (emphasis added). 
Defendants are apparently attempting to disregard their 
stipulation on appeal. Plaintiff urges this Court to affirm the 
district court's judgment and require that defendants be bound by 
their stipulated agreement. To hold otherwise at this point 
would be unwise, unfair, and contrary to the parties' agreement. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S 
ATTORNEY'S SUMMARY TIME SHEETS AND AFFIDAVIT. 
In t h e l a s t p o i n t of d e f e n d a n t s ' b r i e f , they make the 
tenuous argument the d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d in g r a n t i n g p l a i n t i f f 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s above $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . They base t h e i r argument on a 
p r o f f e r d u r i n g t r i a l by Mr. R e a d i n g , p l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y , 
s t a t i n g t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s fee in a case of t h i s kind 
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would be $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , However, a t t h a t t ime t h e d i s t r i c t cour t I 
i n d i c a t e d i t wou ld r e q u i r e a m o r e d e f i n i t i v e s h o w i n g o f 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s by way of d o c u m e n t a t i o n a n d / o r a f f i d a v i t . Mr. 
Reading l a t e r s u b m i t t e d t ime s h e e t s and an a f f i d a v i t r e g a r d i n g i 
p l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . I t i s p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h e 
awarding of a t t o r n e y ' s fees i s w i th in the sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t and s h o u l d no t be o v e r t u r n e d on a p p e a l u n l e s s ^ 
t h e r e i s an abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . 
I t i s we l l s e t t l e d in Utah t h a t an award of a t t o r n e y ' s 
f e e s mus t be b a s e d on an e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s and w i l l no t be " 
ove r tu rned u n l e s s t h e r e has been an a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . S e e , 
P a u l M u e l l e r Co. v . Cache V a l l e y D a i r y A s s ' n . , 657 P .2d 1279, 
1287 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) ( a w a r d of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s mus t be b a s e d on 
e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s and w i l l no t be o v e r t u r n e d u n l e s s t h e r e i s a 
showing of a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n ) ; S e a r s v . Riemersma, 655 P.2d 
1105, 1110 (Utah 1982)(award of a t t o r n e y ' s fees i s in d i s c r e t i o n 
of t r i a l cou r t and w i l l not be o v e r t u r n e d e x c e p t fo r an a b u s e of 
d i s c r e t i o n ) ; Alexander v . Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982)( in 
absence of showing of p a t e n t e r r o r or c l e a r a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n 
in a w a r d of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , Supreme Cour t w i l l no t d i s t u r b 
judgment of t r i a l c o u r t ) . 
I 
In the instant case, plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Reading, 
proffered at trial that he believed a reasonable attorney's fee 
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in an a c t i o n of t h i s n a t u r e was $10 ,000 .00 . In response to t h a t 
p r o f f e r , Judge B i l l i n g s s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : 
J u s t f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f 
c o u n s e l , t h i s C o u r t , i f , in 
f a c t , i t e n d s up a w a r d i n g a 
j u d g m e n t fo r a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , 
f e e l s t h a t p u r s u a n t t o o u r 
l o c a l r u l e s t h a t t h a t would not 
be s u f f i c i e n t and w i l l a s k , i f 
y o u c o u l d , g e t a c c o u n t i n g 
s h e e t s and s i m p l y a t t a c h i t t o 
an a f f i d a v i t . . . . 
T r . 100 (emphasis a d d e d ) . 
Mr. Read ing p roduced t h e r e q u e s t e d a c c o u n t i n g s h e e t s 
and a f f i d a v i t which showed the a c t u a l t ime b i l l e d in t h i s m a t t e r 
amounted t o $ 1 3 , ^ 8 5 . 5 0 . That i s t h e amount of a t t o r n e y ' s fees 
awarded by Judge B i l l i n g s . Defendants a r g u e p l a i n t i f f s h o u l d be 
bound by t h e $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 f i g u r e Mr. Read ing p r o f f e r e d a t t r i a l . 
However, t h i s argument i s wi thout m e r i t . For example, s u p p o s e an 
a t t o r n e y mis t aken- ly p r o f f e r e d a t t r i a l an obv ious ly high or low 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e . C e r t a i n l y , the t r i a l cou r t would not be bound in 
t h a t c a s e t o award a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s a c c o r d i n g to the i n a d v e r t e n t 
p r o f f e r . That i s t h e v e r y r e a s o n J u d g e B i l l i n g s r e q u e s t e d 
a c c o u n t i n g s h e e t s and an a f f i d a v i t from Mr. Reading. I t i s c l e a r 
the d i s t r i c t cou r t a c t e d w e l l w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n in a w a r d i n g 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s b a s e d on t h e a c t u a l h o u r s b i l l e d . T h a t 
w e l l - r e a s o n e d d e c i s i o n must not be d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l . 
no 
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CONCLUSION 
It is well settled in Utah, in the absence of abuse of 
discretion or mistake of law, this Court should affirm the 
district courtTs judgment if there is enough evidence to sustain 
that judgment even if this Court would have reached a different 
decision at trial. Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984); 
Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
1979); Wash-A-Matic, Inc. v. Rupp, 532 P.2d 682 (Utah 1975). 
It is plaintiff's position there was no abuse of 
discretion or mistake of law by the district court in this case. 
Therefore, plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
the district court's judgment in all respects. 
DATED this ^ S ^ day of October, 1985. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
J. Bruce Reading 
Wt**JL*A ^ Jlzz^^ 
Michael W. Spence y 
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
J. BRUCE READING, No. 2700 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-7870 
MAR \<\ 1985 
3 y Q j £ 
Hindi; kz\.Court jC fcV^ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IFG LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION d/b/a RAMADA INN, 
EVANSTON, WYOMING, et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-83-8536 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before 
the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge of the above-entitled 
Court, during the time period of February 21, 1985 through February 
25, 1985, with the plaintiff being represented by Mr. Bruce 
Reading, attorney at law, the defendants Hansen and Gordon being 
represented by Mr. James Barber, attorney at law, and defendant 
Nelson being represented by Mr. John Marshall, attorney at law, 
and the Court having heard evidence and accepted exhibits and hav-
ing reviewed both testimony and documents after taking the matter 
under advisement now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the defendants are residents of Salt Lake 
County, and the Court has jurisdiction of both the individual Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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4 
defendants and the subject matter of this litigation. 
2. That the corporate defendants Ecotek National 
n/k/a Irving Financial Corporation and Bonneville Development 
Corporation are Utah corporations doing business in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and presently, are under the protection 
of the United States Bankruptcy Court having filed Chapter 11 
proceedings. 
3. That during the time period of October 1980 through 
September 1981, the individual defendants were principals in 
the control and operation of Bonneville Development Corporation ,L 
each serving on the board of directors and as officers of the 
corporation, and holding existing shareholder interests or the 
right to acquire that position. 
4. That the defendant Bonneville Development Corpora-
tion d/b/a Ramada Inn, Evanston, Wyoming executed and delivered 
to the plaintiff the following leases on or about the dates f 
indicated: 
a. On or about March 6, 1983, lease no. 56809; 
b. On or about May 14, 1981, lease no. 56810; 
c. On or about June 20, 1981, lease no. 56811; 
d. On or about July 29, 1981, lease no. 56812; and 
e. On or about September 3, 1981, lease no. 57938. 
5. That on or about the dates of the execution of 
each of the five leases, each of the individual defendants, 
Hansen, Gordon, and Nelson, executed a continuing and unconditional 
guaranty agreement whereby they agreed to perform, pay, and 
2
 v. 216 
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discharge all of the defendant Bonneville Development Corporation's 
obligations under the respective lease agreements. 
6. At the time when guaranty agreements were presented 
with each of the above five leases, the guaranty agreements 
were not dated and were not identified by lease number. 
7. That each of the five leases were funded by the 
plaintiff, and the defendant Bonneville Development Corporation 
received the use of personal property pursuant to those leases. 
8. That the last payment made by the defendants under 
any of the lease contracts was on May 13, 1982. 
9. Plaintiff attempted to force payments during the 
summer of 1982, but did not repossess the collateral. 
10. The defendant Bonneville Development Corporation 
d/b/a Ramada Inn, Evanston, Wyoming was placed in receivership 
on the 5th day of October, 1982. 
11. That the defendant Bonneville Development Corporation 
filed for protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah on May 31, 1983. 
12. That on or about March 30, 1984, letters were 
sent to the defendants Gordon, Hansen, and Nelson informing 
them of the date after which the personal property, which was 
the subject matter of the leases, would be sold at private or 
public sale. 
13. The personal property was sold to Commercial Security 
Bank and First Security Bank during the month of September, 
1984 at private sale for the amount of Eighty Five Thousand 
Dollars ($85.000.00). 
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14. Expert witness testimony placed the value of the 
personal property at fifteen to twenty-five percent of the original 
purchase value. The actual amount received was approximately 
eighteen percent (18%) of its original value. 
.15. No written notification of acceleration of payments 
pursuant to paragraph 19(b) of the leases was ever sent by the 
plaintiff to the defendants. Such notification was only given by 
filing of the complaint in this matter on or about 12th day of 
December, 1983. 
16. As a part of plaintiff's bargain, it had established 
residual or salvage value in the equipment of Twenty-Three Thousand 
Eight Hundred Five Dollars and Sixty-Five Cents ($23,805.63). 
17. At the time of the sale of the personal property, 
a wood carving was retained by the plaintiff and not sold with 
the other personal property. 
18. A check in the amount of Six Thousand Dollars^ 
($6,000.00) paid by the plaintiff for certain items of personal 
property under the leases was never cashed. 
19. Attached hereto, as appendix "A" to these findings,^! 
is the recap of all amounts due and owing and amounts credited 
under each of the leases for the sale of equipment. 
20. The defendant Bonneville Development Corporation1 
agreed, pursuant to the lease agreements, to pay any reasonable 
attorney fees. 
21. Plaintiff's counsel has submitted an affidavit* 
in support of attorneyfs fees with said affidavit incorporating 
0 4 « 
I 
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actual time and charges made in this matter. 
22. All of the parties agree that the leases were, 
in fact, financing agreements that were subject to the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
8 II 1. That the guaranties of the individual defendants, 
Rodney F. Gordon, Jim Hansen, and Frank A. Nelson (exhibits 
10 I 2, 9, 16, 23, and 30) were intended by the parties to guarantee 
the leases entered into by Bonneville Corporation and are legally 
binding contracts. Although these documents may have been blank 
as to lease number, date, and even the equipment covered, the 
defendants knew or should have known that the documents were 
15 I intended for the five leases at issue. 
16 2. That the sale of the collateral was commercially 
17 reasonable and conformed to the requirements of the Uniform 
18 Commercial Code. The sale was a private sale, after notice 
19 I was given to the individual defendants, and the price obtained 
20 || was commercially reasonable, 
21 3. The Court finds that the sale of the wood carving 
22 was not commercially reasonable and allows an offset of Ten 
23 Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the price of this carving. 
24 4. The Court finds that the Six Thousand Dollar 
25 ($6,000.00) check that was not cashed should also be allowed 
25 I as an offset, 
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5. The Court finds that the damages should be computed! 
as follows: j 
a. All principal amounts due and owing as of; 
the date of the filing of the complaint should earn interest 
at the the statutory rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. 
b. The plaintiff should be awarded the residual 
value of the equipment in the amount of Twenty-Three Thousand! 
Eight Hundred Five Dollars and Sixty-Five Cents ($23,805.65). 
c. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56809 is One Hundred Sixty-Three Thousand Nine Hundred 
Ninety-Seven Thousand and Ninety-Seven Cents ($163,997.97). 
d. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56810 is One Hundred Seventy-Four Thousand Eight Hundred 
Seventy-Nine Dollars and Fourteen Cents ($174,879.14). 
e. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56811 is Three Hundred Five Thousand Eight Hundred 
Forty-Five Dollars and Sixty-Three Cents ($305,845.63). 
f. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56812 is One Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Six Hundred < 
Seventy-Seven Dollars and Ninety-Two Cents ($148,677.92). 
g. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 57938 is Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred Sixteen Dollars ' 
and Ninety-One Cents ($21,416.91). 
The total amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff 
is Eight Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Three { 
Dollars and Twenty-Two Cents ($838,623.22). 
. ;• 2 2 0 
i 
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6. Defendants should be awarded an offset against 
these damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) 
and Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) for the unpaid check. 
7. The total amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff 
should be Eight Hundred Twenty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-
Three Dollars and Twenty-Two Cents ($822,623.22). 
8. In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff should 
be awarded its attorney's fees .in the amount of <<?ve,nf ann Thoucorrd 
jUOx^dcO. &jChj-lu* W J J A ^ - • C*i%,4*§''<rD V O ^ 
Dollars—(71*7,000.00) •' J cr~>~ 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded its costs incurred 
herein in the amount of Three Hundred Two Dollars ($302.00). 
DATED this l9 day of March, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
C*rtc 
iiddskzL_ 
D«»H*y Oiwfc 
J2L 
Judith M. Billings 
District Court Judge 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on the f/^t day of March, 1985, 
I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to the following: 
John G. Marshall 
Attorney for defendant Nelson 
525 East 300 South, No. 102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
James N. Barcper 
Attorney for defendants Hansen and Gordon 
255 East 400 South, No. 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ATTACHMENT A to Findings of Fact and Conclusions Wf Law ^ w „_,,.'• w 
IFG Leasing Company v. Bonneville Development Corporation, Civil No. C-83-8536
 { 
Amount Interest < 
Lease (Remaining lease Amounts Received 10% from 12/12/83 Bal< 
Number Date payments) Accounts Receivable Sales Taxes (Date complaint filed) Di 
56809 5/13/82 $162,280.08 
9/28/84 
2/21/85 
$16,982.84 $679.31 **$12,849.03 
$ 5,851.70 
$162,: 
$158,: 
$163,! 
56810 5/13/82 $172,385.24 
9/28/84 
2/12/85 
$ 1 7 , 3 9 7 . 2 1 $ 6 9 5 . 8 9 * * $ 1 3 , 6 4 9 . 1 3 
$ 6 , 2 4 1 . 9 8 
$ 1 7 2 , : 
$168,1 
$174, ) 
56811 5/13/82 $301,486.67 
9/28/84 
2/21/85 
$30,428.76 $1,217.15 **$23,871.14 
$10,916.58 
$301, 
$294,' 
$305,1 
56812 5/13/82 $146,558.34 
9/28/84 
2/12/85 
$14,791.41 $591.65 **$11,604.21 
$ 5,306.78 
$146, 
$143, 
$148, 
57938 5/13/82 $21,111.46 
9/28/84 
2/21/85 
$2,130.55 $85.23 $ 1,671.56 
$764.44 
$21, 
$20, 
$21,_ 
••Calculated from date of filing of complaint, December 12, 1983. Total; $838, 
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FEB 27
 1985 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IFG LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, dba RAMADA INN, 
EVANSTON, WYOMING, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-83-8536 
The above-captioned matter was tried to the Court from 
February 21 through February 25, 1985. The plaintiff was represented 
by Mr. Bruce Reading, Esq., defendants Hansen and Gordon by 
Mr. James Barber, Esq., and defendant Nelson by Mr. John Marshall, 
Esq. At the conclusion of testimony and arguments, the Court 
took the matter under advisement to review the legal authorities 
and the voluminous exhibits which had been received. 
The dispute centers on whether the individual defendants 
guaranteed a series of equipment leases (Exhibits 1, 8, 15, 
22 and 29) entered into by Bonneville Development Corporation 
to finance the building of an addition to the Ramada inn in 
Evanston. The defendants were principals in the control and 
operation of Bonneville Development Corporation, each serving 
on both the board of directors and as officers, and either with 
existing shareholder interests or the right to acquire that 
; 204 
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IFG LEASING V. 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
position* Bonneville Development Corporation filed for a receiver-
ship for the Ramada Inn property, and ultimately for bankruptcy. 
As a result, the plaintiff now seeks to recover the amount owed 
under the leases from the individual guarantors. The leases, 
as well as the alleged individual guarantees (Exhibits 2, 19, 
16, 23 and 30) were negotiated and consumated from October 1980 
through September 1981. Although the dates on the personal 
guarantees are all within the same general period as the equipment 
leases, and presently can be matched one to each lease for each 
guarantor by a lease number, they do not always bear the same 
date as the corresponding lease. The defendants claim that 
they executed these guarantee forms in blank, and that they 
were never intended by them to guarantee the leases at issue 
in this litigation.-
There is no dispute that the leases at issue in this litigation 
were funded, and that the defendant Bonneville Development Corpora-
tion received substantial payments under their terms. The Bonneville 
Development Corporation made lease payments pursuant to the 
terms of the contracts, until May of 1982. In October 1982 
a receivership was established, and in May of 1983 the lessee 
Bonneville Development filed for protection under the bankruptcy 
laws. The defendant attacks the written guarantee agreements 
claiming that: (1) the guarantees were not intended for the 
leases in question; and (2) that the plaintiff is estopped from 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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IFG LEASING V. 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
seeking a deficiency against these guarantors on the guarantees 
because the sale of the equipment at issue was not done in a 
commercially reasonable manner. 
< 
I. THE GUARANTEES ARE LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACTS* 
The Court finds that the guarantees in question (Exhibits 
2, 9, 16, 23 and 30) were intended by the parties to guarantee 
the leases entered into by Bonneville (Exhibits 1, 8, 15, 22 
and 29) . The Court is persuaded that the guarantees were presented 
to the defendants in connection with each lease t r a n s a c t i o n . . 
Although these documents may have been blank as to lease number, 
date, and even the equipment covered, the defendants either 
knew or should have known that the documents were intended for ^ 
the five leases at issue in this litigation. The defendants 
at the time they executed these guarantees had no other business 
with the plaintiff, and thus could only have considered that ^ 
the guarantees were for leases for the Ramada Inn. Furthermore, 
the Court is persuaded that several of the leases were actually 
hand-delivered to the defendants at the time they were delivered | 
the leases in question, and that the plaintiff's agent observed 
the signing of the guarantees in connection with the signing 
of the leases. The remaining leases were mailed by cover letter, < 
indicating that they would be required for the funding of the 
leases. The Court does not find it fatal that the guarantees 
were not dated the same date as the corresponding leases, as i 
o A S 
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IFG LEASING V. 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
it was the defendants who failed to date the documents when 
signed. Furthermore, the Court is persuaded by the circumstantial 
evidence that plaintiff communicated to the defendants that 
in order for the plaintiff to obtain funding for their corporation's 
project, they must personally guarantee the leases. Furthermore, 
the defendants argument that they were led to assume that the 
guarantees were for subsequent leases involving a computer, 
or organ, or cash register on other projects is not persuasive. 
The leases at issue were funded before any negotiation took 
place on the subsequent leases. The plaintiff proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that no lease would have been funded 
with Bonneville Development Corporation without personal guarantees. 
Therefore, these guarantees would have to have been signed before 
any subsequent negotiation, as all transactions were funded 
before the end of 1981, and the second series of leases were 
not discussed until 1982. The Court finds that the guarantees 
of each defendant were bargained for by the plaintiff, and that 
they should bind the defendants. 
II. THE SALE OF THE COLLATERAL WAS COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE. 
The parties agree that although these are designated as 
leases, they are in effect financing agreements, and that the 
Uniform Commercial Code applies. Therefore, it was the obligation 
of the plaintiff to preserve the assets, and to sell them in 
a commercially reasonable manner. The Court finds that the 
Off? 
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IFG LEASING V. 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
method, manner, time and place of the sale was in compliance 
with the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code. The defendants 
complain that the plaintiff did not proceed in an expeditious 
manner to repossess and sell the collateral. The Court agrees { 
that the period for sale is longer than would normally be expected. 
The defendants stopped making payments pursuant to the lease 
in May of 1982. It is clear that the plaintiff attempted to < 
force payments during the summer of 1982, but did not repossess 
the collateral. They were then stopped by a filing of a receivership 
in the fall of 1982, and ultimately by a bankruptcy. The Court < 
is persuaded that the peculiar nature of the equipment and the 
intervening receivership - bankruptcy made the long delay reason-
able. The equipment was unique, and much of it attached to * 
the property in Evanston. The plaintiff could have reasonably 
assumed that its best chance of recovery on the collateral was 
to wait until the entire property could be sold by either the 
receiver or the trustee in bankruptcy. The plaintiff could 
reasonably have assumed that the highest bid for the equipment 
would be by the owner of the hotel. Since no bid was received 
for sale of the property, the plaintiff ultimately had to sell 
the equipment to the banks holding mortgages on the property. 
The Court is persuaded that a private sale was reasonable in 
these circumstances. The plaintiff was reasonable in its assumption 
that a public sale would have brought no higher price because 
208 
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IFG LEASING V. 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of the nature of the equipment. Furthermore, the Court finds 
that the amount received for the equipment, $85,000.00, was 
within a reasonable range. The testimony of the appraiser 
was that equipment of this nature should bring between 15% and 
25% of its original value. The equipment was sold for approximately 
18% of its original value. 
Furthermore, the procedural requirements under the Commercial 
Code were complied with as a notice of sale was sent to the 
defendants, Exhibit 43, on March 30, 1984. The collateral was 
then subsequently sold to the banks in September of 198 4. The 
defendants had the opportunity to come forward to purchase the 
collateral for a higher value, or to find purchasers for the 
collateral, and took no action. 
III. DAMAGES. 
The plaintiff is awarded a Judgment against the individual 
guarantors for the principal amounts shown on each of the five 
leases at issue. Further, the plaintiff is awarded prejudgment 
interest at the statutory rate from the date of the filing of 
the Complaint in this action. In addition, the plaintiff should 
be able to recover the book value or residual value under the 
leases in the amount of $23,805.65. From this total amount 
the defendants are awarded an offset of $10,000.00 as a credit 
for a wood carving which the Court finds was not sold in a reasonably 
commercial manner. Finally, the defendants established that 
*-*f\i£k 
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IFG LEASING V. 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
a $6f000*00 check under the lease was not paid/ and therefore 
the plaintiff has no out of pocket expense for this $6/000,00 
amount. Therefore, an additional $6/000*00 should be deducted 
from the final Judgment* 
The Court directs counsel for the plaintiff to prepare 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in conformance with 
the Court's Memorandum Decision/ and a Judgment reflecting the 
amounts due under the reasoning of the Decision. These documents 
should be presented to counsel for the defendants, and then 
to the Court within twenty (20) days. 
Dated this 27th day of February, 1985. 
Cdttfr. 7fl •&///*/? 
JOD^PH M. BILLINGS 7r^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DSXOi HJKDLEY 
•jQ^g&drv £ w ^ 
D*f>uty Cfcr:X 
c?.if 
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IFG LEASING V, 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT PAGE EIGHT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following this 2& daY of February, 1985: 
J. Bruce Reading 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 200 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James VI. Barber 
Attorney for Defendants Hansen and Gordon 
255 East 400 South #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John G. Marshall 
Attorney for Defendant Nelson 
525 East 300 South #102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Q.^aa^ 
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS 70A-9-504 
of the last sentence of subsec. (2); and made 
minor changes in punctuation. 
Cross-References. 
Liability of secured party for failure to 
comply with part 5 of this chapter, 
70A-9-507. 
Policy and scope of chapter, 70A-9-102. 
Secured party's rights on disposition of 
collateral, 70A-9-306. 
Secured party's right to dispose of collat-
eral after default, 70A-9-504. 
Transactions excluded from chapter, 
70A-9-104. 
Use or disposition of collateral without 
accounting permissible, 70A-9-205. 
Collateral References. 
Secured Transactions <S» 227. 
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 104. 
69 AmJur 2d 469 to 473, Secured Trans-
actions §§580 to 582. 
70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default. 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take 
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may pro-
ceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the 
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the 
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make 
it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured 
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a 
secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collat-
eral on the debtor's premises under section 70A-9-504. If a secured party 
elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or 
otherwise. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-503. 
Cross-References. 
Secured party's right to dispose of collat-
eral after default, 70A-9-504. 
Collateral References. 
Secured Transactions <3=» 228. 
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 105. 
69 AmJur 2d 473 to 497, Secured Trans-
actions §§ 583 to 599. 
Validity, under state law, of self-help 
repossession of goods pursuant to UCC 
§ 9-503, 75 ALR 3d 1061. 
Law Reviews. 
Breach of the Peace and New Mexico's Uni-
form Commercial Code, 4 Natural Resources 
J. 85. 
Note, Sniadach, Fuentes and Mitchell: A 
Confusing Trilogy and Utah Prejudgment 
Remedies, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 536. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Replevin. 
Where chattel mortgage provided that in 
event default was made in payment of debt 
mortgagee could take possession of property 
and proceed to foreclose mortgage, mort-
gagee could maintain action in claim and 
delivery to recover such possession after 
default, remedy by foreclosing mortgage not 
being exclusive. Morgan v. Layton (1922) 60 
U 280, 208 P 505. 
70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after 
default — Effect of disposition* 
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose 
of any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any 
commercially reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of 
goods is subject to the chapter on Sales (chapter 2). The proceeds 
of disposition shall be applied in the order following to 
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(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for 
sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like and, to the extent 
provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law, the 
reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the 
secured party; 
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security 
interest under which the disposition is made; 
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate 
security interest in the collateral if written notification of 
demand therefor is received before distribution of the pro-
ceeds is completed. If requested by the secured party, the 
holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably 
furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does 
so, the secured party need not comply with his demand. 
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party 
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise 
agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying 
transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is 
entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the 
security agreement so provides. 
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceed-
ings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or 
other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time 
and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition 
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be com-
mercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens 
to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a 
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of 
any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which 
any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall 
be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed 
after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to noti-
fication of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification 
need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other 
secured party from whom the secured party has received (before 
sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renun-
ciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the 
collateral. The secured party may buy at any public sale and if the 
collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or 
is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard 
price quotations he may buy at private sale. 
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the 
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's 
rights therein, discharges the security interest under which it is 
made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto. The 
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(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowl-
edge of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in col-
lusion with the secured party, other bidders or the person 
conducting the sale; or 
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith. 
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, 
indorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a 
transfer of collateral from the secured party or is subrogated to 
his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured party. 
Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the col-
lateral under this chapter. 
Notice of disposition. 
Secured party is barred from obtaining a 
deficiency judgment after a disposition of the 
property securing the debt where no notice of 
the disposition was given the debtor and the 
disposition was not conducted in a commer-
cially reasonable manner. FMA Financial 
Corp. v. Pro-Printers (1979) 590 P 2d 803. 
History: 
272, §38. 
L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-504; 1977, ch. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1977 amendment inserted "or lease" 
near the beginning of subd. (1) (a); added the 
second sentence of subsec. (2) relating to a 
sale of accounts or chattel paper; substituted 
"if he has not signed after default a state-
ment renouncing or modifying his right to 
notification of sale" at the end of the third 
sentence of subsec. (3) for "and except in the 
case of consumer goods to any other person 
who has a security interest in the collateral 
and who has duly filed a financing statement 
indexed in the name of the debtor in this 
state or who is known by the secured party 
to have a security interest in the collateral"; 
and inserted the fourth sentence of subsec. 
(3) relating to notification of other secured 
parties. 
Cross-References. 
Collateral not owned by debtor, 70A-9-112. 
Compulsory disposition of collateral, 
70A-9-505. 
Contract for sale of goods, breach by 
buyer, resale by seller, 70A-2-706. 
Policy and subject matter of chapter, 
70A-9-102. 
Secured party's liability for failure to com-
ply with part 5 of this chapter, 70A-9-507. 
Notice of sale. 
Secured party should give notice of time 
and place of sale of the collateral to a 
guarantor of the debt. Zions First Nat. Bank 
v. Hurst (1977) 570 P 2d 1031. 
Collateral References. 
Secured Transactions <&=> 229 to 237,240. 
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions §§ 106 
to 113. 
69 AmJur 2d 499 to 532, Secured Trans-
actions §§ 602 to 624. 
Rights and duties of parties to conditional 
sales contract as to resale of repossessed 
property, 49 ALR 2d 15. 
Uniform Commercial Code: burden of proof 
as to commercially reasonable disposition of 
collateral, 59 ALR 3d 369. 
Uniform Commercial Code: failure of 
secured creditor to give required notice of 
disposition of collateral as bar to deficiency 
judgment, 59 ALR 3d 401. 
What constitutes a "public sale," 4 ALR 2d 
575. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Foreclosure by advertisement or sale — 
Perishable property or livestock. 
In proceeding under former section 9-1-6, 
relating to mortgagor's right to enjoin fore-
closure by advertisement and sale, court had 
power, where it appeared that mortgaged 
property was perishable, or that it was live-
stock and that cost of feeding and keeping it 
pending action would be great, to call on 
mortgagor to consent to sale or furnish 
indemnity bond to hold mortgagee harmless. 
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§ 34-21-962. Secured party's right to take possession after 
default (9-503). 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take 
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed 
withoutjudicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may 
proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may 
require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the 
secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is 
reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may 
render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's 
premises under W.S. 34-21-963 (9-504). (Laws 1961, ch. 219, § 9-503; 1983, 
ch. 127, § 2.) 
• > 
Secured party's remedies. — Under law, 
there are five principal remedies given to the 
secured party on default of the terms of a 
security agreement by the debtor (1) use of the 
real estate mortgage foreclosure procedures if 
the security agreement covers both real and 
personal property; (2) collection of accounts 
receivable from those obligated thereon; (3) 
any special remedy provided in the security 
agreement; (4) taking possession of the collat-
eral withoutjudicial process and either accept-
ing it in full satisfaction or selling it and (5) 
taking a judgment on the underlying obliga-
tion and proceeding thereunder. Eggeman v. 
Western Nat'l Bank, 596 P.2d 318 (Wyo. 1979). 
Cited in Western Nat'l Bank v. Harrison, 
577 P.2d 635 (Wyo> 1978); Stephens v, 
Sheridan Pub. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 
594 P.2d 473 (Wyo. 1979). 
Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. 
Liability, under 42 USCS § 1983, of law 
enforcement officer involved in creditor's re-
possession of secured property, 65 ALR Fed 
806. 
§ 34-21-963. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral 
after default; effect of disposition (9-504), 
(a) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of 
any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially 
reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of goods is subject to the 
article on sales (article 2). The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the 
order following to: 
(i) The reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale or 
lease, selling, leasing and the like and, to the extent provided for in the 
agreement and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorney's fees and 
legal expenses incurred by the secured party; 
fii) The satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest 
under which the disposition is made; 
(iii) The satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate 
security interest in the collateral if written notification of demand 
therefor is received before distribution of the proceeds is completed. If 
requested by the secured party, the holder of a subordinate security 
interest must seasonably furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and 
unless he does so, the secured party need not comply with his demand. 
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(b) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must 
account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor 
is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a sale of 
accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for 
any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides. 
(c) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings 
and may be made by way of one (1) or more contracts. Sale or other disposition 
may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but 
every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and 
terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or 
threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a 
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public 
sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or 
other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to 
the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or 
modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no 
other notification need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any 
other secured party from whom the secured party has received (before sending 
his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) 
written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral. The secured party 
may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in 
a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed 
standard price quotations he may buy at private sale. 
(d) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the 
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, 
discharges the security interest under which it is made and any security 
interest or lien subordinate thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such 
rights and interests even though the secured party fails to comply with the 
requirements of this part or of any judicial proceedings: 
(i) In the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of 
any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured 
party, other bidders or the person conducting the sale; or 
(ii) In any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith. 
(e) A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, 
indorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of 
collateral from the secured party or is subrogated to his rights has thereafter 
the rights and duties of the secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a 
sale or disposition of the collateral under this article. (Laws 1961, ch. 219, 
§ 9-504; 1983, ch. 127, § 2.) 
Secured party's remedies. — Under law, real estate mortgage foreclosure procedures if 
there are five principal remedies given to the the security agreement covers both real and 
secured party on default of the terms of a personal property; (2) collection of accounts 
security agreement by the debtor: (1) use of the receivable from those obligated thereon; (3) 
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any special remedy provided in the security 
agreement; (4) taking possession of the collat-
eral without judicial process and'either accept-
ing it in full satisfaction or selling it and (5) 
taking a judgment on the underlying obliga-
tion and proceeding thereunder. Eggeman v. 
Western Nat'l Bank, 596 P.2d 318 (Wyo. 1979). 
Reasons for not using sale. — A sale 
under this section is the remedy most com-
monly used. The usual reasons for not using it 
are: (1) inability to secure peaceable possession 
of the collateral; and (2) desire to be able to 
proceed against assets of the debtor other than 
the collateral. Eggeman v. Western Nat'l 
Bank, 596 P.2d 318 (Wyo. 1979). 
Rule in regard to notice may not be 
waived or varied. Stephens v. Sheridan Pub. 
Employees Fed. Credit Union, 594 P.2d 473 
(Wyo. 1979). 
Execution of judgment on underlying 
obligation. — Usually the judgment on the 
underlying obligation of a security agreement 
is executed on by issuance of a writ of execu-
tion. Such procedure is anticipated by the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Eggeman v. West-
ern Nat'l Bank, 596 P.2d 318 (Wyo. 1979). 
Compliance with subsection (c), etc. 
In accord with original. See Jackson State 
Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1978). 
Lack of notice makes secured party lia-
ble for loss. — A secured party who disposes 
of collateral without reasonable notification to 
the debtor is liable for any loss caused by a 
failure to comply with the provisions of this 
part. Stephens v. Sheridan Pub. Employees 
Fed. Credit Union, 594 P.2d 473 (Wyo. 1979). 
Commercially reasonable requirement 
not to affect demanded notice. — The 
provision of subsection (c) that "every aspect of 
the disposition including the method, manner, 
time, place and terms must be commercially 
reasonable" does not affect the requirement of 
notice demanded bv this section. Jackson State 
Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1978); 
Stephens v. Sheridan Pub. Employees Fed. 
Credit Union, 594 P.2d 473 (Wyo. 1979). 
Secured creditor who purchases collat-
eral from himself, unless he can bring him-
self within the "recognized market" or "stan-
dard price quotations" exceptions, is in the 
same direct violation of the requirements of 
subsection (c) as is the creditor who fails to 
give notice. The courts are not in agreement 
concerning the penalty that is to be imposed 
upon the creditor in such situation. Jackson 
State Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1978). 
Borrower in default entitled to notice of 
transfers by holder of security interest 
which affect borrower's rights. See Western 
Natl Bank v. Harrison, 577 P.2d 635 (Wyo. 
1978). 
Transfer contemplated by subsection (e). 
— When subsection (e) provides for a "trans-
fer" of collateral to a guarantor, a transfer by a 
secured party having the right to do so is 
contemplated. Western Nat'l Bank v. Harrison, 
577 P.2d 635 (Wyo. 1978). 
Law reviews. 
For article, "Wyoming Adopts the 1972 
Amendments' to Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 9 — The Revisions and Some Continu-
ing Problems," see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 
581 (1984). 
Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. 
Construction of term "debtor" as used in 
UCC § 9-504(3), requiring secured party to 
give notice to debtor of sale of collateral 
securing obligation, 5 ALR4th 1291. 
Loss or modification of right to notification of 
sale of repossessed collateral under Uniform 
Commercial Code § 9-504,9 ALR4th 552. 
Sufficiency of secured party's notification of 
sale or other intended disposition of collateral 
under UCC § 9-504(3), 11 ALR4th 241. 
Nature of collateral which secured party 
may sell or otherwise dispose of without giving 
notice to defaulting debtor under UCC 
§ 9-504(3), 11 ALR4th 1060. 
§ 34-21-964. Compulsory disposition of collateral; accep-
tance of the collateral as discharge of obliga-
tion (9-505). 
(a) If a debtor has paid sixty percent (60%) of the cash price in the case of a 
purchase money security interest in consumer goods or sixty percent (60%) of 
the loan in the case of another security interest in consumer goods, and has 
not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his rights under 
this part a secured party who has taken possession of collateral must dispose 
of it under W.S. 34-21-963 (9-504) and if he fails to do so within ninety (90) 
days after he takes possession the debtor at his option may recover in 
conversion or under W.S. 34-21-966(a) (9-507(1)) on secured party's liability. 
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Cross-References. 
Secured party's liability for failure to com-
ply with part 5 of this chapter, 70A-9-507. 
Secured party's right to dispose of collat-
eral after default, 70A-9-504. 
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions §§ 114, 
115. 
69 AmJur 2d 532 to 537, Secured Trans-
actions §§ 625 to 627. 
Collateral References. 
Secured Transactions 238, 239. 
Construction and operation of UCC § 9-505 
(2) authorizing secured party in possession of 
collateral to retain it in satisfaction of obli-
gation, 55 ALR 3d 651. 
70A-9-506. Debtor's right to redeem collateral. At any time before 
the secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for 
its disposition under section 70A-9-504 or before the obligation has been 
discharged under section 70A-9-505 (2) the debtor or any other secured 
party may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the col-
lateral by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral 
as well as the expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party in 
retaking, holding and preparing the collateral for disposition, in arranging 
for the sale, and to the extent provided in the agreement and not prohib-
ited by law, his reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-506. 
Cross-References. 
Compulsory disposition of collateral, 
70A-9-505. 
Secured party's right to dispose of collat-
eral, 70A-9-504. 
Collateral References. 
Secured Transactions <3=» 241. 
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 118. 
69 AmJur 2d 550 to 559, Secured Trans-
actions §§ 639 to 648. 
70A-9-507. 
part* 
Secured party's liability for failure to comply with this 
(1) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in 
accordance with the provisions of this part disposition may be 
ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the 
disposition has occijrred the debtor or any person entitled to noti-
fication or whose security interest has been made known to the 
secured party prior to the disposition has a right to recover from 
the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the 
provisions of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the 
debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount not less than 
the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount 
of the debt or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the 
cash price. 
(2) The.fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at 
a different time or in a different method from that selected by the 
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale 
was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured 
party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recog-
nized market therefor or if he sells at the price current in such 
market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in con-
formity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the 
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70A-10-101 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
type of property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable 
manner. The principles stated in the two preceding sentences with 
respect to sales also apply as may be appropriate to other types 
of disposition. A disposition which has been approved in any judi-
cial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or repre-
sentative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be 
commercially reasonable, but this sentence does not indicate that 
any such approval must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate 
that any disposition not so approved is not commercially reason-
able. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-507. 
Cross-References. 
Obligation of good faith, 70A-1-203. 
Secured party's right to dispose of collat-
eral after default, 70A-9-504. 
Title to collateral immaterial, 70A-9-202. 
Deficiency judgment. 
Secured party is barred from obtaining a 
deficiency judgment after a disposition, pur-
suant to 70A-9-504, of the property securing 
the debt where no notice of the disposition 
was given the debtor and the disposition was 
not conducted in a commercially reasonable 
manner. FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-
Printers (1979) 590 P 2d 803. 
Disposition not made in commercially 
reasonable manner. 
Secured party's disposition of the collat-
eral was not made in a commercially reason-
able manner, and secured party was liable to 
debtor for the value of debtor's equity in the 
collateral, where secured party failed to give 
debtor notice of the disposition and sold the 
collateral for a price equal to the balance due 
on the promissory note when the fair market 
value of the collateral was more than four 
times that amount. Maas v. Allred (1978) 577 
P 2d 127. 
Failure to give notice of sale of collateral. 
Failure by secured party to give debtor 
notice of time and place of sale of the collat-
eral does not release debtor from his obli-
gation to pay any deficiency debt still exist-
ing after the sale; but debtor can recover for 
any loss caused by the failure to so notify. 
Zions First Nat. Bank v. Hurst (1977) 570 P 
2d 1031. 
Collateral References. 
Secured Transactions <&=> 225, 242,243. 
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 119. 
69 AmJur 2d 559 to 567, Secured Trans-
actions §§ 647 to 653. 
Section 
70A-10-101. 
70A-10-102. 
70A-10-103. 
70A-10-104. 
CHAPTER 10 
EFFECTIVE DATE AND REPEALER 
Effective date. 
Specific repealer — Provision for transition. 
General repealer. 
Laws not repealed. 
70A-10-101. Effective date. This act shall become effective at midnight 
on December 31st, 1965. It applies to transactions entered into and events 
occurring after that date. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 10-101. 
70A-10-102. Specific repealer — Provision for transition. 
(1) The following acts and all other acts and parts of acts inconsistent 
herewith are hereby repealed: 
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, Title 44, U.C.A., 1953; 
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EVIDENCE 78-25-17 
Applicability of parol evidence rule ^o 
agreement between stockbroker and custo-
mer, 60 A. L. R. 2d 1135. 
Application and effect of parol evidence 
rule as determinable upon the pleading, 10 
A. L. R. 2d 720. 
Application of parol evidence rule in 
action on contract for architect's services, 
69 A. L. R. 3d 1353. 
Comment note: the parol evidence rule 
and admissibility of extrinsic evidence to 
establish or clarify ambiguity in written 
contract, 40 A. L. R. 3d 1384. 
Distinction between positive and nega-
tive evidence, 140 A. L. R. 530. 
Duty of federal courts to follow deci-
sions of state courts as to the so-called 
"parol evidence rule," and conflict of laws 
as to that rule, 141 A. L. R. 1043. 
Evidence to identify person or persons 
intended to be designated by the name in 
which a contract is made, 80 A. L. R. 2d 
1137. 
Failure to object to parol evidence, or 
voluntary introduction thereof, as waiver 
of defense of statute of frauds, 15 A. L. 
R. 2d 1330. 
History: L. 1951, en. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-25-17. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Except for the substitution of "appear-
ance of alteration" at the end of the first 
sentence for "appearance or alteration," 
this section is identical to former section 
104-48-16 (Code 1943) which was repealed 
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Cross-References. 
Commercial paper, what alterations ma-
terial, 70A-3-407. 
Warehouse receipts, effect of alteration, 
70A-7-208. 
Effect of admission of document. 
The admission of an altered document 
into evidence under this section does not 
require the trier of fact thereafter^ to 
accept the altered document as genuine; 
for admission all that is needed is a 
prima facie showing that one of the condi-
tions enumerated in the section applies; 
Intention of parties with respect to deed 
superseding or merging provisions of ante-
cedent contract imposing obligations upon 
the vendor, 38 A. L. R. 2d 1317. 
Parol evidence concerning receipt clause 
in bill of lading, 67 A. L. R. 2d 1028. 
Parol evidence rule as applicable to 
agreement not to engage in competition 
with a business sold, 11 A. L. R. 2d 1227. 
Parol evidence rule as applied to guar-
anty, 33 A. L. R. 2d 960. 
Parol evidence rule as applied to lease, 
151 A. L. R. 279. 
Parol evidence rule as applied to ques-
tion of easement by necessity or visible 
easement, 165 A. L. R. 567. 
Parol evidence to show duration of writ-
ten contract for support or maintenance, 
14 A. L. R. 2d 897. 
Proof under parol evidence rule of place 
where cash consideration for goods pur-
chased is payable, in absence of written 
provision in sales contract, 49 A. L. R. 2d 
1353. 
Showing of sham agreement not in-
tended to create legal relations, 71 A. L. 
R. 2d 382. 
afterward, the burden remains upon the 
party contending for the document as 
altered to convince the trier of fact that 
it is the one accurately reflecting the 
agreement of the parties. Hartman v. 
Young, 551 P. 2d 229. 
Notations on promissory note. 
Where notations on back of note were 
admittedly made by the maker and no 
alteration appeared on its face, note 
was admissible under predecessor section. 
Shumwav v. Anderson, 98 U. 144, 96 P. 2d 
1098. 
Collateral References. 
Alteration of Instruments«@=24(2). 
3A C.J.S. Alteration of Instruments 
§§ 21, 22. 
4 Am. Jur. 2d 35, Alteration of Instru-
ments § 35. 
Admissibility of books of account as af-
fected by mutilation, erasures, or altera-
tions, 142 A. L. R. 1406. 
78-25-17. Writings bearing obvious alterations—Explanation required. 
—The party producing as genuine a writing which has been altered, or 
appears to have been altered after its execution in a part material to 
the question in dispute must account for the appearance of alteration. 
He may show that the alteration was made by another without his 
concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, 
or otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration does 
not change the meaning or language, of the instrument. If he does this, 
he may give the writing in evidence, but not otherwise. 
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available as a witness: 
(1) Present tense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or im-
mediately thereafter. 
(2) tacked utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condi-
tion. 
(S) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the 
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such 
as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not indud-
ing a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless 
it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment Statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, 
or past ©represent symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character 
tamed* in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on fam-
ily portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a 
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the 
content of the original recorded document and Ha execution and delivery by each per-
son by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is s record of a public 
office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in 
that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement 
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the 
matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, tcnless dealings with the 
property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the truth of the 
statement or the purport of the document. i 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence" 
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established, \ 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, 
lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally vised and relied upon by 
the public or by persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises, lb the extent called to the attention of an expert witness 
upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements con-
tained in published trestises, periodicals, or pamphlets on s subject of history, 
medicine, or other science or art, established sa a reliable authority by the testimony 
or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If 
admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as ex-
hibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among 
members of bis family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among his associates, or in 
the community, concerning s person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, 
legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry,, or other similar 
•• fact of his personal or family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a 
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting 
lands in the community; and reputation SB to event* of general history important to 
the community or State or nation in which located. 
(21) Reputation aa to character. Reputation of a person's character among his 
associates or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered 
siter a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging 
a person guflty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, 
to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, out not including, when offered by 
the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judg-
ments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be 
shown but does not affect admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. 
Judgments ss proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, 
essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of reputation. 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the forego-
ing exceptions but having equivalent drcmnstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if 
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and ( O the 
general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice win best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted 
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
of the cause or extemsl source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about 
which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable 
him to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the wit-
ness when the matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge cor-
rectly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not 
itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Recorda of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made 
at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, 
if kept in the course of s regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the 
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of prepara-
tion indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" MM used in this paragraph 
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every 
kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in.the memoranda, reports, 
records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter • 
was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was reg-
ularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compila-
tions, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forih (A) the activities of the 
office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which 
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters 
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil sctions 
and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings result-
ing from an investigation msde pursuant to suthority granted by law, unless the 
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of 
births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public 
office pursuant to requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry, lb prove the absence of a record, report, 
statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a 
lar facts of personal or xamuy History, w n w m «. . «*»—.., « , 
gious organization. M 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contain* 
in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or admmi 
tared a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorised k 
the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act eertifiei 
and purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reenonable tin 
thereafter. 
(13) Family recorda. Statemenu of fact concerning persoruU or famfly history ©a 
tained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on fai 
ily portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the ike. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record ej 
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of|| 
content of the original recorded document and ita execution and delivery by oach pt 
ton by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record of a pub 
office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents of that land 
that office. 
(15) SUtemenU in doeumenta affecting an interest in property. A ststem* 
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if t 
matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with t 
property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the truth of t 
statement or the purport of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient doeumenta. Statemenu in a document in existex 
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established. i 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulatiol 
lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon 
the public or by persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises, l b the extent called to the attention of an expert wrtm 
upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements o 
tained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets, on a subject of histo: 
medicine, or other science or art, established ss s reliable authority by the testinx 
or sdmission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice, 
admitted, the statemenu may be read into evidence but may not be received as 
hibiu. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation ami 
members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among his associates, d 
the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, des 
legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other simi 
fact of his personal or family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation i 
community arising before the controversy, MM to boundaries of or customs affect 
lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general history important 
the community or State or nation in which located. 
(21) Reputation aa to character. Repuution of a person's character among 
associate* or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, enta 
after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere),, adjud| 
a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one yi 
to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offeree 
the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, jt 
menu against persons other than the accused. The pendency of v\ appeal ma) 
shown but does not affect admissibility. 
(2$) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or b a n d a r 
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundai 
essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of repute! 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the for 
tng exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trastworthines 
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered ss evidence of a material! 
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any o 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and ( Q 
general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be serve* 
sdmission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admi 
under thia exceotion unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse p 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or bearing to provide the adverse party with < 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the pa? 
lars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 
Committee Note to Rale 903. 
This Rale is the federal rule, verbatim. 
Subdivision (1) is comparable to Rule 63(4), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule 
63(4Xb), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State 
v. McMillan. 688 P.2d 162 (Utah 1978). 
Subdivision (3) is a similar provision to Rule 
63(12). Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (4) is comparable to Rule 63(12), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (5) had no express counterpart 
in Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), although 
Rule 63(4X0 embodied some of the substance 
but spotted only where the declarant was un-
svsilsble. Decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court have reeognued such an exception. So-
gers v. International Smelting Co.. 50 Utah 
423, 168 Pac. 105 (1917). The Utah courts have 
sanctioned the sdmission of the record of the 
past recollection, contra to this rule. Sagers v. 
International Smelting Co., supra. 
Subdivision (6) is comparable to Rule 63(13), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Former Rule 
63(13) has been given broad application. Banv 
brough v. Bethers, 662 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976); 
State v. Marques, 560 P^d 342 (Utah 1977). 
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. 
Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). The 
rule allows computerized records snd data to 
be admitted. See Barney v. Cox, 688 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978). 
Subdivision (7) is similar to Rule 63(14), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (8) is similar to Rules 63(16) and (16), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) and Utah 
Code Annotated, Sections 78-25-3 snd 78-26-4 (1953). Barney v. Cox. 688 P.2d 696 (Utah 
1978). 
Subdivision (8XO is substantially the same 
ss Rules 63(15), (16) and (17), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). See also, Price v. Torner, 28 
Utah 2d 328, 602 P^d 121 (1972); Bridges v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 26 Utah 2d 281, 
488 P.2d 738 (1971). 
Subdivision (9) is similar to Rule 63(18), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) as related to 
the sdmission of evidence of certificates of 
marriage snd Rules 63(24) and (25), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) covering vital statis-
tics in certain instances. See also In re Lewis, 
121 UUh 385. 242 P.2d 565 (1952). 
Subdivisions (11), (12) sad (IS) are c 
rable to Rules 68(23) throsgh (26), Utah 
of Evidence (1971) and In re Leva, so) 
Subdivisions (14) and (16) are eompsn 
Rules 63(19). (22) and (29). Utah Bales < 
deace (1971). 
Subdivision (16) is eeatparsble to 
63(19) and 67, Utah Rube of Evidence 
and Olsen v. Swapp, 636 P.2d 1233 
1975). 
Subdivision (17) is comparable to 
63(30), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (18) is comparable to 
63(31), Uniform Rules ef Evidence C 
which was not adopted m Utah. Hoi 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-25^, 
provides for the admissibility of hist 
works, books of science or art, published 
or charts. See also Hilton v. Roylance, 2! 
129. 69 Pac. 660 (1902). In Jenkins v. Pi 
627 P^d 533 (Utah 1981), the court b 
expert could be mas uaaainii from a k 
treatise which the expert ass recucnii 
authoritative, or that the expert has reh 
or that is established as authoritative I 
other expert. Such evidence would a 
admissible on the substance of the case. 
Subdivision (19) is comparable to 
63(26), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (20) is comparable to 
63(27), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (21) is comparable to 
63(28). Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (22) is comparable to 
63(20), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (23) is comparable to 
63(24), (26) and (27), Utah Rules of £v (1971). 
Subdivision (24) has no counterpart u 
Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Croee-Referettces. 
Historical works, books of science sj 
and published maps and charts ss evi 
Law Reviews. 
Relative Relevance—A limitation i 
Use of State of Mind lostimony in He 
Prosecutions, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 85. 
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78-2546.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be destroyed in the regu-
lar course of business unless held in a custodial ^r fiduciary capacity -or unless its 
preservation is required by law; and such reproduction, when satisfactorily identi-
fied, is as admissible in evidence as the original itself in any judicial or administra-
tive proceeding whether the original is in existence or not, an enlargement or 
facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible in evidence if the original 
reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of court. 
The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement or facsimile, does not pre-
clude admission of the original. 
In the cases mentioned in subdivisions (3) and (4), a copy of the original, or of 
the record, must be produced; in those mentioned in subdivisions (1) and (2), either 
a copy or oral evidence of the contents. 
attempt to produce the records. Meyer v. 
General American Corp. (1977) 569 P 2d 1094. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-25-16; L. 1983, ch. 165, § 1. 
Original in possession of adverse party. 
Testimony concerning the defendant com-
pany's records was properly admitted into 
evidence as an exception to the best evidence 
rule where the president of the defendant 
company, who had custody of the records, 
refused to grant access to the records and 
had left the state so the records could not be 
produced, and the plaintiff had made an 
Writing only part of agreement. 
Where record established that writing 
effecting assignment of passbook account was 
only part of agreement between parties, the 
parol evidence rule did not bar consideration 
of other statements and writings which 
formed part of the total agreement. Aird Ins. 
Agency v. Zions First Nat. Bank (1980) 612 P 
2d 341. 
78-25-16.5. Business record — Admissibility — Weight. (1) As used in this 
section, "business" includes business, profession, occupation, and calling of every 
kind. 
(2) In any court in this state, any writing or record, whether in the form of 
an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, 
transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of that act, trans-
action, occurrence, or event, if made in the regular course of any business, and if 
it was the regular course of the business to make the memorandum or record at 
the time of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable time 
thereafter. 
(3) All circumstances, other than those set forth in subsection (2), of the mak-
ing of the writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant 
or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but those circumstances do not affect 
its admissibility. 
History: C. 1953, 78-25-16.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 165, § 2. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to evidence; adding provi-
sions regarding admissibility of business 
records. 
This act amends section 78-25-16, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; and enacts section 
78-25-16.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953. -
Laws 1983, ch. 165. 
CHAPTER 26 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WRITINGS 
78-26-2. Right to inspect and copy. 
Cross-References. 
Salary information as to employees of 
institutions of higher education private, 
53-48a-5. 
Salaries of college employees. 
The right of the public to have and to pub-
lish the salaries paid to college employees 
outweighs considerations as to the right of 
106 
MISCl 
privacy of the employees, or of th 
tion to carry on its operations 1 
Redding v. Brady (1980) 606 P 2d 
see 53-48a-5. 
Misd 
Section 
78-27-24. 
78-27-51. 
78-27-52. 
78-27-53. 
78-27-54. 
78-27-55. 
78-27-56. 
78-27-57. 
78-27-58. 
Jurisdiction over nonresi 
Inherent risks of skiing -
Inherent risks of skiing -
Inherent risks of skiing 
from risks inherent in 
Inherent risks of skiinj 
liability. 
Repealed. 
Attorney's fees — Awan 
Attorney's fees awarded 
sion — Reimbursemen 
Service of judicial proce* 
78-27-24. Jurisdiction ovei 
diction. Any person, notwiths 
or resident of this state, who ii 
ing enumerated acts, submits h 
tive, to the jurisdiction of the c 
(1) The transaction of any I 
(2) Contracting to supply SQ 
(3) The causing of any inji 
of warranty; 
(4) The ownership, use, or j 
(5) Contracting to insure a 
at the time of contracting?; 
(6) With respect to actions 
nance in this state of a matrJ 
commission in this state of the 
(7) The commission of sexi 
a paternity suit under Chapter 
of establishing responsibility f 
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, §3 
160, §1. 
Contracting to supply services o 
Utah court's exercise of jurisd 
nonresident manufacturer did not 
process and was a valid exercise 
tional power where although sue! 
turer was a corporation located in 
had no offices in Utah, owned no 
Utah, employed no representatifl 
did not solicit business or adverti 
late sales materials in Utah, sue 
turer did employ representativ< 
states and supplied goods to buj 
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